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Inefficiency and Self-Determination:
Simulation-Based Evidence From Meiji Japan

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Inefficiency and Self-Determination: Simulation-based evidence from Meiji Japan

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Abstract

Does the exercise of the right of self-determination lead to inefficiency? This paper considers a set of centrally planned municipal mergers in Japan during the Meiji period, using data from Gifu prefecture. The observed merger pattern can be explained as the social optimum of a tradeoff between within-municipality geographic heterogeneity and efficiencies of scale. If individual feudal villages had been allowed to choose their merger partners, counterfactual simulations show that the core is always non-empty, but core partitions contain about 80% more (post-merger) municipalities than the social optimum. Simulations are computationally feasible because core partitions can be calculated using an algorithm based on repeated application of a mixed integer program.

Does exercise of the right to self-determination result in an efficient arrangement of political boundaries? There is substantial theoretical interest in this issue both inside and outside of economics, and recent world events, such as the Russian annexation of the (apparently consenting) Crimean peninsula, suggest policy relevance.\textsuperscript{1} Empirical results regarding the efficiency of jurisdiction formation, however, are very limited.

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\textsuperscript{1}Additional recent episodes include the 2014 independence referendum in Scotland and the 2014 independence non-referendum in Catalonia. The 1995 independence referendum in Quebec is a somewhat earlier example. Alesina and Spolaore [2003] provide an extensive theoretical treatment.
This paper considers a historical set of municipal mergers in Gifu, Japan, that were decided by a central planner in the late 19th century. We show that the observed pattern of new municipal boundaries corresponds reasonably well to that of a social planner maximizing a sum of utilities of individuals in an Alesina and Spolaore [1997] type model: there is a tradeoff between efficiencies of scale in the provision of public goods, and geographic heterogeneity in the jurisdiction in which the public goods are provided. The parameter governing this tradeoff is estimated using a “measurement error only” model of the form suggested in Pakes [2010], and a parameter describing the efficiencies of scale is calibrated based on official government reports and observed spending.

A counterfactual case is then considered, where pre-defined subunits corresponding to feudal villages were allowed to choose how to arrange themselves into jurisdictions in a coalition formation game without transfers. The core is used as the solution concept in this decentralized jurisdiction formation game, and results are obtained via simulation.

The first result is that the core is non-empty, given the actual data and parameter estimates. This is not obvious theoretically, and there are well-known simple examples (e.g. Gale and Shapley [1962]) where the core is empty in a one-sided matching game. Despite these potential theoretical difficulties with the “right to self-determination” as operationalized in this paper, empirically there are always outcomes that satisfy the relevant conditions.

In the model used, core partitions are automatically Pareto optimal. Payoffs for players, however, are quasi-linear with respect to money, and we consider inefficiency from a utilitarian perspective. In one case the partitions in the core are very close to the partition that would be selected by the social planner: this is the case where the data is modified so that all players in the coalition formation game have the same per capita tax base. If there is “horizontal” heterogeneity among players, but no “vertical” ranking, it thus appears that allowing jurisdiction boundaries to be established by a decentralized process results in minimal inefficiency.

In contrast, when the actual data regarding per capita tax base is used, core partitions involve about two-thirds more coalitions than the social planner’s preferred partition. This is likely because game is a version of the “partnerships” of Farrell and Scotchmer [1988]: each player in the coalition formation game would prefer to merge with others that are richer than themselves, while avoiding poorer players. The resulting lack of mutually desirable mergers results in coalition sizes being substantially smaller than those that the social planner would select.

The utilitarian perspective is of interest because it formalizes an intuitive notion of “good” and “bad” coalition structures. An example of this presented later in the paper is Figure 8: this coalition structure is likely Pareto optimal, but is regarded by disinterested Japanese observers as an undesirable outcome.
Even more problematic decentralized partitions sometimes appear when municipalities are receiving some sort of equalization payment from the national government. We consider stylized versions of equalization systems actually used in later periods in Japan. One of these systems turns out to improve the quality of decentralized partitions, making them very close to the social planner’s preferred partition, but another results in about four times as many coalitions forming as the social planner would choose. A back of the envelope calculation suggests that this could translate into inefficiency equivalent to several percent of GDP. As modern states are frequently characterized by elaborate systems of fiscal transfers, this result suggests why attempted decentralized municipal mergers are frequently regarded as unsuccessful, with mandated boundary changes instead employed by central authorities.

From an econometric perspective, we consider standard moment inequality estimators following Pakes [2010], as well as some estimators based on stronger distributional assumptions. These additional estimators allow us to consider alternative specifications containing additional covariates. The results from these specifications suggest that geographic heterogeneity was indeed far more important in determining the political boundaries chosen than religious, agricultural, historical, or other sorts of heterogeneity. The additional estimators thus provide justification for the preferred moment inequalities specification.

The main methodological contribution of the paper concerns the computation of core partitions when enumeration of potential coalitions is computationally infeasible. An iterative approach using myopic deviations is employed, with each successive deviation computed using a mixed integer program. The coalition formation game in Gifu consists of approximately 1000 players: we compute core partitions in a few hours using standard equipment.

This paper is inspired by Desmet, Breton, Ortuño-Ortín, and Weber [2011], who consider European national boundaries as a coalition formation game. Desmet et al. use solution concepts that are more restrictive than the core in order to theoretically guarantee the existence of a stable partition, and then obtain parameters via a bounding exercise. They then conduct counterfactual simulations using exhaustive enumeration. In contrast, this paper uses the core as the solution concept, obtains parameters via moment inequalities and related estimation techniques, and conducts simulations without enumerating the possible outcomes. The data used in Desmet et al. [2011] differs from that considered in this paper, however, in that their data shows the outcome of a decentralized coalition formation game, rather than a partition chosen by the central planner. Using boundaries chosen by the central planner as the basis for parameter estimation dramatically simplifies some aspects of the estimation problem.\footnote{Issues regarding multiple equilibria, for example, are difficult to avoid when the data comes from a decentralized coalition formation game, but disappear when a central planner (with strict preferences) has}
A number of other papers consider formal approaches to parameter estimation in the case of coalition formation games. These include Brasington [1999], Gordon and Knight [2009], and Weese [2015b]. The techniques presented in this paper for estimation would require at minimum substantial modification before they were appropriate for use in that situation.\(^4\) On the other hand, the estimators used in each of the three papers just mentioned rely on specific properties of the dataset that they consider, and thus none of them are applicable to the ostensibly simpler discrete choice problem considered below.\(^5\)

Within the discrete choice literature, Fox [2010] considers the “rank order property”, which if satisfied would allow for parameter estimation in discrete choice models using only a subset of the choices, via maximum score estimation. One of the estimators considered in this paper is in fact implemented as a smoothed maximum score estimator, although the assumptions differ from the estimator proposed by Fox.

This paper appears to be the first quantitative study of municipal mergers in Meiji Japan. Previous work on more recent Japanese municipal mergers includes Hirota and Yunoue [2014], Miyazaki [2014], and Weese [2015b]. The techniques used and results obtained in these papers differ substantially from those presented below.\(^6\)

The remainder of this paper has the following structure: Section 1 presents the theoretical model, Section 2 describes the econometric model, Section 3 introduces the data used, Section 4 discusses the estimation results, Section 5 covers the counterfactual simulations performed, and Section 6 concludes.

\section{Model}

We consider a modification of the Alesina and Spolaore [1997] model of political jurisdiction formation, using a functional form for distance costs taken from Desmet et al. [2011]. Let

\(^4\)Brasington [1999] uses a bivariate probit with partial observability, but does not explicitly specify how the observed partition was formed. Gordon and Knight [2009] use a simulation GMM estimator with data that contains pairwise mergers. Parameter estimation in Weese [2015b] relies on special financial merger incentive policies of a known form, combined with substantial auxiliary data.

\(^5\)There is also an extremely extensive literature on two-sided matching. Stability properties in these models guarantee the existence of stable partitions, and algorithms such as the deferred acceptance algorithm allow for easy computation of these partitions [Roth, 2008]. Two-sided matching markets, however, differ fundamentally from coalition formation games with only one type of player.

\(^6\)Hirota and Yunoue [2014] uses a logit framework to look at political determinants of mergers. Miyazaki [2014] uses data on municipal referenda. Weese [2015] considers recent Japanese data where the central government provides equalization payments to municipalities. The observed equalization payments in this recent data are extremely large (up to 25\% of GDP per capita for the smallest municipalities), and counterfactuals where there are no such payments are thus so far out of sample that there would be computational difficulties with any such simulation, as well as theoretical difficulties in interpreting the results.
there be $N$ players, each of whom needs to receive local government services. Player $i$ has income $y_i$ and an inelastic demand for $p_i$ units of services.\(^7\) A coalition $m$ of players can provide $P$ units of municipal services to themselves at a cost of

$$c(P) = \gamma_1 + \gamma_2 P. \quad (1)$$

The total cost of providing services will thus be $c(P_m)$ for coalition $m$, where $P_m = \sum_{i\in m} p_i$.\(^8\) The interesting case is the one where $\gamma_1 > 0$, as then the average cost per unit of service declines as more players are added to a coalition. The situation is that of a club good, where $\gamma_2 > 0$ corresponds to the case with congestibility.

There is no quality dimension to the services provided, and the cost of providing them must be paid via proportional taxation. The budget constraint for coalition $m$ is

$$\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 P_m = \tau_m Y_m \quad (2)$$

where $Y_m = \sum_{i\in m} y_i$. Other than the proportional taxation at $\tau_m$, there is no redistribution or other transfers within a coalition. For a given municipality $m$, there is no choice regarding the tax rate $\tau_m$ as it is determined by the budget constraint.

In addition to the amount of taxes paid, players care about the identity of their coalition partners. This setup corresponds to a hedonic coalition formation game as described in Bogomolnaia and Jackson [2002].\(^9\) Specifically, the utility of player $i$ in coalition $m$ is given by

$$u_{im} = \beta_1 L(i, m) y_i + \beta_2 \tau_m y_i \quad (3)$$

where $L(i, m)$ is the heterogeneity that $i$ experiences as a member of coalition $m$. We would expect that $\beta_1 < 0$ and $\beta_2 < 0$, as both heterogeneity and taxation are undesirable. Heterogeneity will be assumed to take the form

$$L(i, m) = \frac{\sum_{i'\in m} \ell_{ii'} y_{i'}}{Y_m} \quad (4)$$

where $\ell_{ii'}$ is the distance between $i$ and $i'$. This specification for heterogeneity follows Desmet et al. [2011]: players experience disutility proportional to the average distance between them.

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\(^7\)In the empirical application below, a player will correspond to a feudal village, and $p$ will be taken to be the population of the village.

\(^8\)In the coalition formation literature, coalitions are often denoted by $S$. Here $m$ is used instead because the coalitions in question correspond to municipalities.

\(^9\)This is the hedonic game originally considered in Dreze and Greenberg [1980], except without transfers of any sort.
A slightly unusual feature of the specification in Equation 3 is that richer players suffer greater disutility from distance. If the distances in question are geographic, then this could be due to a greater time cost of travel for those with higher incomes.\footnote{This form of $L$ is based on Greenberg [1956], as extended by Lieberson [1964]. It differs from the “distance to policy” heterogeneity cost used in Alesina and Spolaore [1997] and subsequent papers. Earlier work includes Greenberg and Weber [1986]. A literature review is provided in Donder, Breton, and Peluso [2012].}

For the model in this section, and for the counterfactual simulations later on, distance will be taken to be geographic distance. However, when estimating parameters, we will also consider more complicated specifications where other sorts of distances are also included.\footnote{This specification makes computation of core partitions substantially easier, and will also better match the observed coalitions in the data used. A further advantage is that empirically the players will correspond to feudal villages, containing multiple households with different levels of $y$. The preferences described in Equation 3 lead to all of these households having the same preferences over mergers: to see this, divide the equation by $y$. Thus, the specific form chosen allows us to ignore within-village heterogeneity in income.}

Let $\pi \in \Pi$ be a partition of players into coalitions, where $\Pi$ is the set of all possible partitions. A Benthamite social planner would choose the partition

$$
\pi_{FB}^\pi = \arg\max_{\pi \in \Pi} \sum_i u_{i\pi} = \arg\max_{\pi \in \Pi} \beta_1 \sum_{m \in \pi} \frac{1}{m} \sum_{i \in m} \sum_{i' \in m} \ell_{ii'}y_{i}y_{i'} + \beta_2 \gamma_1 |\pi|
$$

\hspace{1cm} (5)

where $u_{i\pi}$ indicates the utility that player $i$ receives from whatever coalition it belongs to in partition $\pi$. In Appendix A we show that Equation 5 is equivalent to a weighted Herfindahl index in the case where there are discrete types of players.

The intuition for the social planner’s problem is clearly visible in Equation 5: the tradeoff facing the planner is between the first term (heterogeneity within each municipality $m$), and the second term (the fixed cost of running $|\pi|$ municipalities). The variable cost $\gamma_2$ does not appear in Equation 5. This is because there are always $\sum_{i=1}^{N} p_i$ units of municipal service demanded, regardless of the partition chosen.

This optimal partition $\pi_{FB}^\pi$ is generically unique. A well-known special case is where the $\ell$ are given by euclidean distances, determined by players’ locations on some plane. In the limiting case, where the players are tiny, uniformly distributed on the plane, and otherwise identical, the optimal partition is given by a regular hexagonal tiling. This was first discussed in the “central place theory” of Christaller [1933].\footnote{Drèze, Le Breton, Savvateev, and Weber [2008] provides extensive citations regarding hexagonal tiling results. The efficient partition will be stable in this case because any deviation to a larger hexagon would be} In general, however, there is no closed-

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\footnote{In this case, $\beta_1$ and $L$ become vectors, and each distance would be calculated following Equation 4, using $\ell_{ii'}, p_{ii'}$, and so forth. These distances then enter additively in the utility function in Equation 3.}
form solution for the optimal partition, and it must be computed via some combinatorial optimization technique.

Our interest is in comparing $\pi^{FB}$ with partitions that would form in the case of a decentralized coalition formation game. Intuition suggests that partitions resulting from a decentralized process will have coalitions that are on average smaller than those that would be selected by the social planner. Players at the “edge” of a coalition are experiencing high disutility from distance, and at the same time are being charged a tax rate $\tau$ determined by the total cost of providing services, rather than the marginal cost. These are the players that are most likely to deviate, and the incentives that they are faced with are different and more conducive to splitting than the objective being maximized by the social planner.

Any verification of this intuition, however, first requires a formalization of the concept of a “right to self-determination”. This appears to be well represented as a formal solution concept by the core. In the coalition formation game without transfers considered in this paper, the core is

$$\Pi^* = \{\pi | \forall S^* \notin \pi, \exists i \in S^* \text{ s.t. } u_{i||} \geq u_{i|S^*}\}.$$  

(6)

There is the possibility that $\Pi^*$ is empty, and a substantial amount of work has been devoted to finding conditions under which the non-emptiness of $\Pi^*$ is guaranteed. These conditions include “consecutiveness” [Greenberg and Weber, 1986], “intermediate preferences” [Demange, 1994], and the “top coalition property” [Banerjee, Konishi, and Sönmez, 2001], among many others.\(^{14}\) In general, the results in this literature have been mostly negative: it is difficult to find conditions under which the core is guaranteed to be non-empty, and even more difficult to define these conditions in such a way that they can be easily checked. In this paper we will ignore this issue, and instead show below that core partitions exist given our data and parameter estimates.

The choice of the core as the solution concept differentiates the Alesina and Spolaore [1997] type model used from Tiebout [1956] type sorting models, where the equilibrium is defined only by individual and not coalitional deviations.\(^{15}\) In the taxonomy offered by Scotchmer [2002], the model is one of a “spatial club” good, related to work such as Hochman, Pines, and Thisse [1995].

\(14\) Banerjee et al. [2001] provides a detailed literature review.

\(15\) Other differences from the canonical Tiebout model include efficiencies of scale that are never completely exhausted, a (locally) small number of communities, and individual players that are each of a distinct type.
2 Estimation Strategy

The observed outcome is a partition of $N$ players into coalitions, chosen by a central planner. Estimation of the parameters of a structural model where the outcome takes this sort of partition form presents substantial difficulties. As any structural model proposed is extremely unlikely to explain the observed outcome perfectly, an error term of some sort needs to be included as part of the data generating process. The number of possible coalitions, however, is very large: with $N$ players, there are $2^N - 1$ potential coalitions.\(^{16}\)

A model that includes an idiosyncratic term for each of these possible mergers will lead to some potential mergers having extremely positive idiosyncratic shocks. This causes problems similar to those discussed in Berry and Pakes [2007], where an increasing number of products results in consumer utility increasing without bound if there is an idiosyncratic shock representing “taste for products”. The situation here, however, has an additional feature that makes a “taste for products” approach particularly unattractive: the number of potential coalitions is a function of the size of the coalition: there are $N$ coalitions of size 1, $N(N - 1)$ coalitions of size 2, and $\binom{N}{k}$ coalitions of size $k$. The total number of coalitions is thus non-monotonic in $k$.\(^{17}\) To simplify discussion, consider the case where coalitions are generally smaller than $N/2$. In this region, the total number of coalitions of size $k$ is increasing in $k$. If idiosyncratic shocks are uncorrelated, generally some of the larger coalitions will then have positive shocks much larger than those of any of the smaller coalitions.

If the correlation structure of the error term were misspecified such that the true correlation were underestimated, estimates for other parameters from this specification would generally be biased such that only the smallest mergers appeared attractive from a structural perspective, and the explanation for larger observed configurations would be that these were mergers with very positive idiosyncratic shocks. Conversely, if the model of the correlation structure were incorrect such that the correlation in the idiosyncratic term between partitions were overestimated, then the opposite bias in estimates of other parameters would occur: parameter estimates would suggest that larger mergers were very desirable, and that the smaller mergers that were observed occurred because of very positive idiosyncratic shocks.

From a theoretical perspective, a correctly specified correlation structure for the idiosyncratic shocks would eliminate the problem just discussed, and any standard estimation technique could be employed. From a practical perspective, even if it were possible to model the correlation structure of the idiosyncratic shocks correctly, estimators of this sort tend to

\(^{16}\)The total number of possible partitions of players into coalitions is given by the Bell numbers, and grows superexponentially in $N$.

\(^{17}\)There are only $N$ coalitions of size 1, only $N$ coalitions of size $N - 1$, and only one coalition of size $N$, but there are many coalitions of an intermediate size.
involve high dimensional integrals and are not computationally feasible.\textsuperscript{18}

This paper uses a “measurement error only” model in which there are no payoff-relevant idiosyncratic shocks to avoid this problem. Models of this sort have a long history in econometrics [Morgan, 1990], and have seen recent application in moment-inequality models [Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii, 2015].

Motivated by the data available, we assume that most covariates are potentially measured with error. “Standard” instruments do not appear to be of much use: we provide further discussion of this point in Appendix B.

We are interested in the case of a utilitarian central planner. We thus simplify notation by defining

\[ u_m = \sum_{i \in m} u_{im} \]  

(7)

to be the total payoff for players participating in merger \( m \), and

\[ u_\pi = \sum_{m \in \pi} u_m \]  

(8)

to be the total payoff for all players of partition \( \pi \). Define \( X_{\pi FC}^* \) to be equal to \( \gamma_1|\pi| \), the second term in Equation 5. This is the fixed cost of running the \(|\pi|\) municipalities present in partition \( \pi \). As discussed in Section 1, the variable cost does not depend on the partition \( \pi \). We thus do not create a \( X_{\pi VC}^* \) variable, as it would be identical for all partitions.

Next, define \( X_{\pi D}^* \) to be the (distance) heterogeneity experienced in partition \( \pi \). This is the first term in Equation 5, and is calculated as

\[ X_{\pi D}^* = \sum_{m \in \pi} \frac{1}{Y_m} \sum_{i \in m} \sum_{i' \in m} \ell_{ii'} y_i y_{i'} \]  

(9)

The value of the social planner’s objective for partition \( \pi \), given in Equation 5, can now be rewritten as

\[ u_\pi = X_{\pi}^* \beta^0. \]  

(10)

where \( \beta^0 \) is the true value of \( \beta = (\beta_1, \beta_2)^T \). The econometrician does not observe \( X_{\pi}^* \), but instead sees

\[ X_\pi = X_{\pi}^* + \eta_\pi, \]  

(11)

\textsuperscript{18}There are a few specific forms for the idiosyncratic shock that might make estimation feasible, but these forms appear unlikely to match whatever shocks are actually present in the data. Logit models, which are valid even when considering only a subset of the choices, are not appropriate because the IIA assumption is obviously violated: idiosyncratic payoffs for the \( \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\} \) coalition should be correlated with those for the \( \{1, 2, 3, 4, 6\} \) coalition.
where $\eta_\pi$ is a measurement error vector.\(^{19}\) Estimation will be based on comparing the characteristics of the observed partition, $X_{\pi^0}$, to the characteristics of another partition, $X_{\pi'}$, for many possible alternative partitions $\pi'$.\(^{20}\) As we are interested in the differences in characteristics between partitions $\pi'$ and $\pi^0$, let

$$\tilde{X}_{\pi'} = X_{\pi'} - X_{\pi^0}$$

(14)
denote this difference, with $\tilde{X}_{\pi^*}$ and $\tilde{\eta}_{\pi^*}$ defined similarly. Note that

$$\tilde{X}_{\pi'; \beta^0} \leq 0$$

(15)
must hold for all $\pi' \in \Pi$, because the central planner chose $\pi^0$ optimally based on Equation 5.

In the model presented in Section 1, $\beta_1$ and $\beta_2$ were both scalars. It is easy to extend this theoretical model, however, to the case where there are several different types of heterogeneity, and $\beta_1$ is a vector describing the relative importance of these different types. If $\beta_1$ has even moderate length, and the distances describing each of these types of heterogeneity are assumed to be measured with error, then a standard moment inequalities approach will not result in acceptably narrow confidence sets for $\beta$. We thus consider some additional potential assumptions, beginning with the least plausible:

**Assumption 1.**

\begin{itemize}
  \item[a)] $\tilde{X}_{\pi^*}$ is distributed uniformly on a half-sphere satisfying Inequality 15.
  \item[b)] $\tilde{\eta}_{\pi^*} \sim N(0, \sigma^2 I)$, i.i.d.
\end{itemize}

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\(^{19}\)This matches the form of the payoffs given in Equation 3 if population (which determines $\tau_m$) and tax bases $y_{itm}$ are measured without error, and $X^*$ is interpreted to be data giving the distances $L(i, m)$. The model thus assumes that the distances are measured with error, not whatever underlying variables generate the distances. If the latter were the case, additional work would be required to explain the distributional assumption that will introduced shortly: under certain circumstances the error term could still be normally distributed, but the model in general becomes more complex.

\(^{20}\)When thinking about these alternative partitions $\pi'$, we will generally have in mind partitions such as

$$\pi' = \{(\pi^0 \setminus \{m_1, m_2\}) \cup \{m_1 \cup m_2\}\}, \text{ with } m_1, m_2 \in \pi^0,$$

(12)

where one additional merger has taken place, or

$$\pi' = \{(\pi^0 \setminus \{m_1' \cup m_2'\}) \cup \{m_1', m_2'\}\}, \text{ with } m_1' \cup m_2' \in \pi^0,$$

(13)

where there has been one fewer. There is nothing specific in the model that requires these sorts of alternative partitions to be considered, but the assumptions used to calculate standard errors for $\tilde{\beta}$ will appear more reasonable with these alternative partitions.
Here neither Assumption 1.a nor Assumption 1.b appears particularly reasonable. We consider them because together they suggest the following pseudo-likelihood estimator:\(^{21}\)

\[
\hat{\beta} = \arg\max_\beta \sum_{\pi' \in \Pi'} \log \Phi(-\tilde{X}_{\pi'} \beta).
\] (16)

This equivalent to a probit model with covariates \(\tilde{X}\) and an outcome variable equal to 0 for all observations. As \(\tilde{X}\) does not contain any constant column, this is a probit model without an intercept term.\(^{22}\)

The probit has been used extensively, with assorted variations, in the empirical literature examining political jurisdiction formation: Brasington [1999] is an early example. We consider this model both because it provides a link with the existing empirical literature, and because, despite requiring assumptions that strain credibility, the estimates produced turn out to be surprisingly similar to those from the models that will be considered below.\(^{23}\)

Assumption 1 is not very satisfying. We thus continue by considering the following:

**Assumption 2.**

a) \(\tilde{X}_{\pi'}^*\) is distributed on a bounded region satisfying Inequality 15.

b) \(\tilde{\eta}_{\pi'} \sim N(0, \sigma^2 I), \ i.i.d.\)

Here the assumption regarding the distribution of \(\tilde{X}^*\) is more pleasant, but the uncomfortable assumption regarding the distribution of \(\tilde{\eta}\) remains. This is the same assumption that appears in the total least squares literature, and is undesirable because estimates will depend on the units in which the data is expressed.\(^{24}\)

Let the distribution of \(\tilde{X}_{\pi'}^* \beta^0\) be \(F_{\tilde{X}_{\pi'} \beta^0}\). Then by Assumption 2,

\[
\tilde{X}_{\pi'}^* \beta^0 = \tilde{X}_{\pi'}^* \beta^0 + \tilde{\eta}_{\pi'} \beta^0
\] (17)

---

\(^{21}\)This is a pseudo-likelihood estimator because the likelihood is \(\frac{1}{c} \int_{S} f(\tilde{X}^* - \tilde{X}) d\tilde{X}^*\), where \(S\) is the half-sphere, \(c\) is a normalizing constant, and \(f\) is the multivariate standard normal density. If the region of integration \(S\) were the half-plane defined by \(\tilde{X}^* \beta > 0\) instead, then the integral would be proportional to \(\Phi(\tilde{X}^* \beta) = \int_0^\infty \phi(w - \tilde{X}^* \beta) dw\), but it is not. In either case, \(\sigma\) will not be recovered correctly.

\(^{22}\)Why is there no intercept? Each alternative partition \(\pi'\) could have been selected, but was not, and each row of \(\tilde{X}\) gives the characteristics \(\tilde{X}_{\pi'}^*\) comparing that partition to \(\pi^0\). If there were a \(\pi'\) that appeared to have identical characteristics to \(\pi^0\), then this partition must have \(\tilde{X}_{\pi'} = 0\). There thus should not be an intercept term.

\(^{23}\)Often empirical papers provide OLS estimates, even though OLS appears clearly inappropriate. We offer probit estimates in a similar spirit.

\(^{24}\)A variety of solutions have been proposed, including Samuelson [1942]. Markovsky and Van Huffel [2007] provides a recent overview of the literature.
has a distribution that is a convolution of $F_{X^* \beta^0}$ and a $N(0, \sigma^2 \| \beta^0 \|^2)$ distribution. Write this as

$$F_{X^* \beta^0} = F_{X^* \beta^0} \ast N(0, \sigma^2 \| \beta^0 \|^2)$$

(18)

where $\ast$ is the convolution operator. This suggests an estimator using the empirical distribution $\hat{F}_{X^* \beta}$ to calculate via deconvolution an estimated distribution $\hat{F}_{X^* \beta}$, and then verify that in fact this distribution satisfies Assumption 2.a.

Deconvolution is a challenging problem, particularly when the errors are “supersmooth”, which is the case for normally distributed errors.25 A direct approach via inverting the characteristic function runs into severe difficulties. We first consider an approach based on a deconvoluting kernel estimator.

Fan [1992] proposes an estimator for the deconvolution problem with normal noise, based on kernel density estimation using a normal kernel. Kernel density estimation involves a convolution of the kernel with a sample from the distribution of interest. Fan notes that deconvolution and convolution are inverse operations. If the bandwidth used for kernel density estimation is sufficiently large, then the deconvolution is entirely cancelled out. In this special case, a deconvoluting kernel has the same form as the normal kernel used for density estimation, albeit with a bandwidth calculated very differently. Starting with a standard normal kernel, Fan [1992] shows that the corresponding deconvoluting kernel is

$$K_n(x) = \frac{h_n}{\sqrt{2\pi(h_n^2 - \sigma_0^2)}} \exp \left( -\frac{h_n^2 x^2}{2(h_n^2 - \sigma_0^2)} \right).$$

(19)

where $h_n$ is the deconvolution bandwidth, and $\sigma_0^2$ is the variance of the error. In our case, $\sigma_0^2 = \sigma^2 \| \beta \|^2$.

This deconvoluting kernel is only appropriate in the case where the errors are “small”, and Fan [1992] defines “small” in a way that shrinks with the sample size, meaning that at some sufficiently large sample size the errors will cease to be “small”. A discussion of asymptotic properties is thus not really appropriate.26

In the deconvolution literature, estimators that are not consistent are often considered because they appear to have better finite sample properties than those that are consistent [Carroll and Hall, 2004]. The Fan [1992] estimator is of particular interest because from the perspective of implementation it turns out to be very close to the Manski [1975] maximum score estimator.

25See Fan [1991] and references therein for a detailed discussion of the distinction between “supersmooth” and “ordinary smooth”.

26It might be possible to construct a sequence of estimators that uses the deconvoluting kernel in Equation 19 initially before switching to another approach, such as the deconvolution that follows Assumption 3, but we do not pursue this argument.
Specifically, the deconvoluting kernel in Equation 19 can be used to produce an estimate \( \hat{F}_{\tilde{X}^*} \beta \) for any \( \beta \). The restriction in Assumption 2.a implies that \( F_{\tilde{X}^*\beta^0}(0) = 1 \), and estimation can be performed using the sample analog:

\[
\hat{\beta} = \arg\max_{\beta} \hat{F}_{\tilde{X}^*}(0)
\]  

(20)

The condition for identification is quite natural: any hyperplane other than that described by \( \beta^0 \) must have some of the support of \( \tilde{X}^* \) on both sides of the hyperplane.\(^{27}\) For computation, note that the kernel in Equation 19 corresponds to a normal kernel with bandwidth of \( \tilde{h} = \sqrt{h_n^2 - \sigma^2_0} \). For a given \( \tilde{h} \), the estimate \( \hat{F}_{\tilde{X}^*}(0) \) takes a form equivalent to that of the smoothed score considered in Horowitz [1992]:

\[
\hat{F}_{\tilde{X}^*}(0) = \sum_{\pi' \in \Pi'} \Phi(-\frac{\tilde{X}_{\pi'} \beta}{\tilde{h}}).
\]  

(21)

An obvious problem here is that \( \sigma^2_0 \) is unknown; however, any choice for \( \tilde{h} \) corresponds to some choice of deconvolution bandwidth \( h_n \), given the actual \( \sigma^2_0 \). Thus, choosing \( \tilde{h} \) arbitrarily gives a deconvolution estimator of the form of Equation 19, albeit with a suboptimal choice of \( h_n \). The resulting estimator is extremely close in terms of implementation to a smoothed maximum score estimator, although the interpretation of the smoothing is very different. An estimate of \( \sigma^2_0 \) is not obtained, and a normalization of \( \beta \) is required.\(^{28}\)

It is useful to compare this estimator to one that has desirable asymptotic properties. For this, consider a standard deconvolution approach. The assumptions needed in this case are

**Assumption 3.**

a) \( \tilde{X}_{\pi'} \) is distributed on a bounded region satisfying Inequality 15.

b) \( \tilde{\eta}_{\pi'} \sim N(0, \Sigma) \), i.i.d.

Consider a sieve estimation approach [Grenander, 1981] for producing an estimate of the univariate distribution \( \hat{F}_{\tilde{X}^*\beta^0} \). This is slightly non-standard, but will lead to a minimum-distance style estimator, and is substantially easier than estimating the multidimensional distribution \( \hat{F}_{\tilde{X}^*} \). As with the maximum score style estimator of Equation 20, \( F_{\tilde{X}^*\beta^0}(0) = 1 \).

\(^{27}\)This would be satisfied, for example, if the support of \( \tilde{X}^* \) includes a half-sphere around the origin. Intuitively, the support needs to include points where the central planner is almost indifferent between choosing \( \pi' \) and \( \pi^0 \).

\(^{28}\)Assumption 2.b suggests the normalization \( ||\beta||^2 = 1 \), but we find that \( \sum_i |\beta_i| = 1 \) gives better results, and thus use that normalization instead.
The simplest sieve estimator for $F_{X^* \theta}$ is a step function with $J$ steps, where $J$ would grow with the sample size. Let this estimator be $\hat{F}_{X^* \theta}$, where $q$ is a length $J$ vector of quantiles that fully specifies the step function. The corresponding minimum distance estimator is then

$$\hat{\beta} = \arg\min_{\beta} \min_{q, \sigma^2} Q(F_{X^* \theta}, \hat{F}_{X^* \theta} * N(0, \sigma^2))$$

(22)

where $\sigma^2 = \beta^T \Sigma \beta$, and $Q$ is some minimum distance statistic. This is easily computable once the normalization $||\beta||^2 = 1$ is imposed.

Finally, and as our main specification, we consider the case where only the standard assumptions required for a moment inequality approach are imposed:

**Assumption 4.**

- $\tilde{X}_{\pi'}$ is distributed on a bounded region satisfying Inequality 15.
- $\tilde{\eta}_{\pi'}$ is distributed with mean zero conditional on the instruments.

The instruments we will use are population $p$ and tax base $y$. We consider moments based on the restriction

$$E[\tilde{X} \beta^0] = E[\tilde{X}^* \beta^0 + \tilde{\eta}] = E[\tilde{X}^* \beta^0] + 0 
\leq 0$$

(23)

which follows from Assumption 4. We use moments that correspond to subsets of the data.

---

29 We use the Anderson-Darling test statistic.
30 Kneip, Simar, and Van Keilegom [2015] provide a method for problems of this type, but unfortunately it does not appear to be applicable in this case because the “boundary” in our case is at $X^* \beta = 0$, whereas in Kneip et al. [2015] it is positive.
31 The definition of $\tilde{\eta}_{\pi'}$ includes $\pi^0$, and thus $\pi^0$ is also implicitly being used as an instrument here. This is valid because there is no payoff relevant idiosyncratic shock in the model, and measurement error $\eta$ is mean zero even after conditioning on the partition chosen by the central planner.
32 Empirically, some scaling of $\tilde{X}$ is necessary. We choose to scale the columns of $\tilde{X}$ so that their mean absolute values are equal.
33 Specifically, the inequalities just described should hold for municipalities regardless of their population, but savings due to efficiencies of scale are different at different sizes. Consider small (< 800), medium (1600 - 2400), and large (2400-) municipalities separately. Similarly, the inequalities should also hold for various levels of wealth: consider municipalities with a low koku rating (<2000) and a high koku rating (>2000) separately. Finally, consider those municipalities in particularly rural areas, as indicated by the presence of mountains, separate from those municipalities in the flatter central areas.
3 Data

We use data from Gifu Prefecture in Japan. During the Meiji period, a set of municipal mergers (the *Meiji Daigappei*) were mandated by the central government as part of its modernization policies: prefectural and national officials acted as a central planner, in Gifu drawing new boundaries such that 1090 historical feudal villages were grouped into 288 modern western-style municipalities. Mergers occurred across the country, mainly in the 1880s and 90s, and are described in more detail in the introduction to Appendix I. We concentrate on Gifu because high quality data on covariates is only available for that prefecture. The main advantage of historical data is that it better matches the simple theoretical model presented in Section 1. The precise form of this model turns out to be important: in Section 5, we will show how it makes it computationally feasible to perform counterfactual simulations of a decentralized coalition formation game.

The main dataset for covariates is the *Gifu-ken Chouson Ryakushi* (GKCR) of 1881 and related documents.\(^{34}\) This covers the southern portion of Gifu, describing 1111 feudal villages that were combined to form 286 western-style municipalities.\(^{35}\) The initial boundaries of these villages from the GKCR are shown in Figure 1, and the boundaries after the mergers are shown in Figure 2.\(^{36}\)

To match the model to the data, let the players be feudal villages. For population, we use the figures reported in the GKCR.\(^{37}\) Figure 3 shows the population density of feudal villages. Villages with higher population density have municipalities with smaller surface area, while those areas with lower population density have jurisdictions with larger area.

---

\(^{34}\)The GKCR was originally digitized by Skinner [1988], but he does not appear to have used it in published work. The GKCR version used is courtesy of Tsunetoshi Mizoguchi and Kei Okunuki, based on an original version at the Skinner Data Archive. A bilingual codebook is available in Mizoguchi [2004].

\(^{35}\)There is a lengthy debate in the domestic Japanese literature regarding the exact definition of a *shizen son*, and the approach used in this paper is necessarily a simplification. Yamaoka [1977] provides detailed examples. Regardless of the vocabulary used to describe the units in question, data is available because they were administratively important: this was the base level at which taxes were collected during the feudal period.

\(^{36}\)The post-merger boundaries are based on official 1919 municipal boundaries provided by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism. Two mergers and one split that occurred in 1903-05 were reversed (the next boundary change did not occur until 1921). The boundaries shown in Figure 2 are thus those of 1897, except for one minor boundary adjustment that does not affect any calculations. The most comprehensive list of municipal changes appears to be that maintained by M. Higashide at http://uub.jp/. For Gifu, we cross-checked these with the *Gifu-ken Chouson Gappeishi*.

\(^{37}\)Migration does not appear to have been that substantial in Gifu during the period in question, although substantial urbanization was occurring elsewhere in Japan. The GKCR includes data on migration: only 0.8% of individuals were classified as migrants. This classification is based on *honseki*, which should capture all individuals that migrated, and possibly also children of migrants.
Figure 1: Feudal villages, Gifu Prefecture, 1881

Figure 2: Municipalities, Gifu Prefecture, 1897
pattern follows the “size density hypothesis” of Stephan [1977], which has been subjected to considerable study outside of economics.\textsuperscript{38}

In terms of economic theory, the observed pattern is consistent with the model presented above, in which there are efficiencies of scale in the provision of services that are provided at a single point, combined with some distance cost. In Appendix C we present a brief qualitative discussion of why a model based instead on the internalization of externalities appears to be inappropriate in this particular case.

For tax base, we use the \textit{koku} ratings reported in the GKCR. This is historical land tax data, and, although denominated in rice, covers all sorts of production. As discussed in Appendix I, land tax was the most important source of revenue during this period, and thus use of the \textit{koku} ratings seems appropriate.

The boundaries shown in Figure 1 describe each feudal village as a polygon. However, in most cases, the villages in the GKCR correspond to one or more clusters of houses, surrounded by the land worked by these households. Although a household level map is not available for Gifu, the \textit{Jinsoku Chizu} of 1880 shows the precise location of households for part of eastern Japan. Appendix Figure 10 shows a representative rural area: the households are clearly clustered, and the location of households could be reasonably accurately described using only a small number of points. We take advantage of this feature of the population distribution of this period, and create a new dataset based on points rather than polygons.

To do this, we use geocoded gazetteer data on Meiji locations, courtesy of the Center for

\textsuperscript{38}In Gifu, the pattern continues to hold for the post-merger municipalities. The pattern also holds across a wide selection of countries, and varieties of jurisdictions [Stephan, 1984]. Suzuki [1999] provides additional citations along with an application to Japanese data. The pattern does not appear to be due to measurement error: this possibility was discussed in Vining, Yang, and Yeh [1979] and Stephan [1979].
Integrated Area Studies at Kyoto University. This data is based on the 1891 and subsequent official maps of Gifu Prefecture. The relevant subset of this data is shown in Appendix Figure 11: the gazetteer classifies points into types, and the most important for our purposes are “place” points. About half of the feudal village polygons have exactly one “place” within their boundaries. For these villages, we use this point as their geographic location. If a feudal village has more than one “place”, then we keep track of all of these points, and will use them all (with equal weighting) for distance calculations. Treatment of other cases is described in Appendix F.1. Appendix Figure 12 shows the points that are used.

For reporting simulation results graphically, we will display each feudal village as a single point, with a location equal to the mean latitude and longitude for the points associated with that feudal village. These “display points” are shown in Appendix Figure 13. This is purely for ease of presentation, however, and all calculations described subsequently are done over multiple points for the feudal villages that have them.

In order to speed computation of core partitions, we sometimes collapse the smallest feudal villages into other nearby villages that ended up in the same merger. Thus, instead of 1099 players, computations are actually performed using 910 players.\(^{39}\)

For distance \(\ell\), we begin by calculating a straight-line distance and a walking distance, based on the point data just discussed. Details regarding these calculations are provided in Appendix F.2. We also calculate distances for other sorts of heterogeneity: Table 1 gives the complete list of covariates used. Details regarding these covariates and their calculation are given in Appendix F.3.

With the theoretical model described in Section 1 and the estimation strategy described in Section 2, the importance of the fixed cost \(\gamma_1\) is identified relative to the cost of heterogeneity. It is not possible, however, to say anything about the importance of the variable cost \(\gamma_2\) using data on the partition chosen by the central planner. This is because \(\gamma_2\) does not enter into the optimization problem in Equation 5. For counterfactual simulations, however, the value of \(\gamma_2\) may be important, as it affects the tax rate \(\tau_m\), which in turn affects the individual payoffs given in Equation 3. A value for \(\gamma_2\) thus needs to be chosen, and this choice requires the use of some sort of auxiliary data.

\(^{39}\)It is unclear why this 20% decrease in the number of players results in a dramatic speedup in computation times. One potential explanation is that the presence of particularly small players prevents certain otherwise useful heuristics from being applied successfully in the mixed integer program.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Data Sources Used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>¥</td>
<td>Fixed cost of providing public services</td>
<td>Niigata-ken Shichouson Gappei Shi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIST.WALKING</td>
<td>1000 sec.</td>
<td>Distance in terms of walking time</td>
<td>Center for Integrated Area Studies, Kyoto Univ. (points)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Geospatial Information Authority of Japan (elevation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIST.STRAIGHT</td>
<td>km</td>
<td>Straight line distance</td>
<td>Center for Integrated Area Studies, Kyoto Univ. (points)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELIGION</td>
<td>Herfindahl</td>
<td>Differences in religious sect identities</td>
<td>GKCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRODUCTION</td>
<td>Herfindahl</td>
<td>Differences in (agricultural) products</td>
<td>GKCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROPERTY</td>
<td>Herfindahl</td>
<td>Differences in types of property</td>
<td>GKCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LORD</td>
<td>Herfindahl</td>
<td>Differences in identity of feudal lord during period before Meiji Restoration</td>
<td>GKCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FISH</td>
<td>100*Herfindahl</td>
<td>Differences in fishing activity</td>
<td>GKCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEALTH</td>
<td>Herfindahl</td>
<td>Differences in land holding distribution</td>
<td>GKCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH300</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Are there more than 300 households?</td>
<td>GKCR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH500</td>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Are there fewer than 500 households?</td>
<td>GKCR</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table 2: Cost of providing local government services

<table>
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<th>population</th>
<th>cost</th>
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<tr>
<td>“large”</td>
<td>$3165$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“medium”</td>
<td>$\frac{3165}{2}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“small”</td>
<td>$\frac{3165}{4}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>population</th>
<th>cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“large”</td>
<td>$c_1 + c_2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“medium”</td>
<td>$\frac{2}{3}c_1 + \frac{c_2}{2}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“small”</td>
<td>$\frac{1}{2}c_1 + \frac{c_2}{4}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: government document reproduced in *Niigata-ken Shichouson Gappei Shi*.

During the merger period, government bureaucrats produced a document describing the cost of providing public services for municipalities of three sizes: these costs are shown in Table 2.\(^{40}\) Here $c_1 = ¥545.668$ was a constant that corresponded to administrative costs that exhibited efficiencies of scale, and $c_2 = ¥1467.931$ was a constant corresponding to costs that did not exhibit efficiencies of scale. At the three points provided, the costs correspond exactly to a cost function of the form used in Equation 1, with a fixed cost $\gamma_1 = c_1/3$, and a variable cost $\gamma_2 = \frac{2c_1/3+c_2}{3165}$, despite the fact that statistically there is an extra degree of freedom. There is no explanation offered of how the government arrived at these estimates, and thus it is unclear whether they believed that a cost function with only a fixed cost and a variable cost was particularly appropriate, or whether at the sizes that they chose to examine the efficiencies of scale happened to fit this pattern.

There is no documentation available describing how these numbers were arrived at, but some verification of other sorts is available. Data on actual municipal expenditures is available for 1881, before the implementation of the new municipal system. This is shown in Figure 4, along with the cost function based on Table 2. Reiter and Weichenrieder [1997] survey the existing literature and conclude that there has been limited success in using actual expenditure data to estimate efficiencies of scale. For comparison purposes, however, a bivariate regression is provided in the figure. Finally, in 1950, when roughly the same municipal structure was still in place, a government document describing the efficiencies of scale in the provision of public services was produced.\(^{41}\) This document provides a detailed breakdown of efficiencies of scale by service, for 20 public services, with the cost of each service described by a spline function with 6 knots. Despite the gap of 60 years and a sub-

\(^{40}\)A population of 3165 appears to have been used as the base because it corresponded to the average population served by an administrative office under the briefly-used “ward” system, described in Appendix I.1.

\(^{41}\)This is the *kijun zaisei jyouyou gaku* portion of the *heikou konfukin*. 
Data points indicate actual spending by precursors to final municipalities: this data is from 1881, when the final municipal system was still under development. OLS is bivariate, predicting total spending based on population and intercept (the line is curved as a result of transformation to log scale). The Meiji “govt” line is based on the fixed cost plus variable cost associated with the three data points discussed in the main text, with an adjustment to take into account that some services were paid not paid for by municipalities when the 1881 data was collected, and some revenue and associated expenses appears not to have been included. The Showa “govt” line is exactly the functional form provided in 1950 government documents describing the efficiencies of scale in the provision of local public goods, but has been normalized such that it is equal to “govt (meiji)” at a population of 3165 (the reference population for the Meiji government document).
### Table 3: Summary Statistics ($\bar{X}$)

<table>
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<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>-0.02</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.09)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(1.94)</td>
<td>(2.59)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIST.STRAIGHT</td>
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<td>0.47</td>
<td>1.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.99)</td>
<td>(2.06)</td>
<td>(2.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.03</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
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<td>0.0004</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
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<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.05</td>
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<td>(0.74)</td>
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<td>(0.61)</td>
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<td>FISH</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
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<td>0.003</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.17</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HH500</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.55)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2257</td>
<td>1733</td>
<td>3990</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data described is $\bar{X}$. As described in Equation 14, this is the difference between the characteristics of the partition actually observed, and an alternative partition. The underlying characteristics used to calculated these differences are described in Appendix F.
stantial expansion in the number of public services provided, the estimates match the 1890 figures very closely, as shown in Figure 4.\textsuperscript{42} We thus use values of $\gamma_1$ and $\gamma_2$ corresponding to Table 2.

Using the values of $p$, $y$, $\ell$, and $\gamma$ just discussed, we create $\tilde{X}$ matrices with which to use the estimators discussed in Section 2. We create three such data matrices, in order to ensure that estimates do not vary wildly depending on the precise partitions considered. The alternative partitions that are used as comparison partitions are described in the following section. Details regarding how each row of $\tilde{X}$ is constructed given an alternative partition $\pi'$ are provided in Appendix G. Summary statistics regarding the data matrices are provided in Table 3.

4 Results

Table 4 gives results from the “probit” model of Equation 16, based on Assumption 1. Estimates are shown for a variety of different sets $\Pi'$ of alternative partitions, described below. The parameter $\beta_2$, describing the importance of the fixed cost, is not identified if all the alternative partitions have the same number of (post-merger) municipalities as the actually observed partition $\pi^0$.\textsuperscript{43} We first consider a set of alternative partitions that has this characteristic, in order to be able to ignore the cost of providing services, and instead focus purely on the tradeoffs the central planner appears to have made between different sorts of heterogeneity. Columns I-IV of Table 4 show results using $\Pi'_1$, a set of 2257 alternative partitions created by moving player $i$ from municipality $m_1$ to $m_2$, such that alternative partition $\pi'$ contains $m'_1 = m_1 \setminus i$ and $m'_2 = m_2 \cup i$, instead of $m_1$ and $m_2$.\textsuperscript{44}

Column I provides estimates of the tradeoff between seven types of heterogeneity: geographic distance, as expressed in minutes of walking time, and six other variables. Comparing the coefficient estimates in Column I with the standard deviations in Table 3, we see that geographic distance appears to be the most important determinant of the boundaries of political jurisdictions: the standardized coefficient is four times higher than that of any of the other variables.

\textsuperscript{42}An additional difference is that the 1890 figures appear to have been produced to describe the appropriate size for municipalities during the reorganization, while the 1950 figures were for use in an equalization transfer program. The different purpose suggest that any political biases in the reported figures would also be quite different.

\textsuperscript{43}This is because regardless of the partition chosen, there will be $\gamma_1|\pi'| = \gamma_1|\pi^0|$ paid in fixed cost, as all partitions considered have the same number of municipalities.

\textsuperscript{44}This is done for all $i$, $m_1$, and $m_2$, such that $m_1$ contains at least two players, and $i$ is geographically adjacent to $m_2$. This produces a total of 2257 moves.
Table 4: Parameter Estimates (Probit)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>VI</th>
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<td>FIXED.COST</td>
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<td>-0.88***</td>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
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<td>-0.05***</td>
<td>-0.07***</td>
<td>-0.06***</td>
<td>-0.05***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIST.STRAIGHT</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
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***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05

Note: variance of error term is set to $\sigma^2 = 10$, which makes **fixed.cost** coefficient close to -1. Tradeoffs in table are thus (close to) interpretable in terms of yen.
We might wonder whether there is any evidence that the central planner actually chose boundaries following the sort of model outlined in Section 1. One alternative hypothesis is that the planner simply followed the instructions in Interior Ministry Order 352 exactly. These instructions stated that municipalities should have between 300 and 500 households. In Column II, we include two additional variables to take into account these instructions. The first variable is statistically significant, but the second is not, and inclusion of these variables does not have a substantial effect on the other coefficient estimates. It thus appears that the central planner may have been paying attention to the lower limit of 300 households, but was also clearly considering other factors when deciding the pattern of mergers. The raw data shows that the upper limit appears to have been less respected than the lower: Figure 5 shows that a substantial number of mergers resulted in municipalities of more than 500 households.

We also might wonder whether there is any evidence in the data that the central planner actually considered walking distances, rather than simply looking at straight line distance, as the latter is easier seen on a map. Column III repeats Column I, except substituting straight line distance for walking distance. There is no substantial change in coefficients, other than the coefficient on distance being somewhat lower. This is not particularly surprising, because straight line distance and walking distance are highly correlated. Column IV includes both distances. Here we see that the coefficient on walking distance has the expected sign and if anything a slightly higher magnitude than Column I, whereas the coefficient on straight

---

45 The construction of these variables is given in Appendix F.3.
46 There are 9 fewer observations in Column II because data on the number of households was not available.
line distance is statistically insignificant and has the opposite sign. We thus conclude that the planner seems to have followed the Ministry instructions to consider the convenience of transportation, and did not take the dramatic shortcut assuming that Gifu was flat, and that all points that appeared to be equidistant on a map were in fact equally easy to reach.

Column V uses a different set of alternative partitions $\Pi_2'$. This is a set of 1733 alternative partitions created by considering a partition where two adjacent municipalities were merged together, or a partition where one of the municipalities was split into two. With the alternatives in $\Pi_2'$, there are now a different number of municipalities in the alternative partition than in the actual partition $\pi^0$ (either one fewer or one more), and thus the importance of the fixed cost $\beta_2$ is now identified relative to the importance of the different sorts of heterogeneity. The only major difference in Column V is the coefficients on property and production, the former of which is smaller and the latter larger, compared to Columns I-IV. The types of land present in a municipality are closely related to the types of products produced, and the effect of these two covariates may thus be difficult to separate.

Column VI reports results using a combined dataset, considering all the alternative partitions $\Pi_1' \cup \Pi_2'$. The results are broadly similar to those reported in the preceding columns. Due to the assumptions required, the probit model reported in Table 4 is most useful for preliminary analysis and quickly checking multiple specifications. We thus continue with models based on more plausible assumptions.

For subsequent tables, we normalize so that fixed cost always has a coefficient of -1. As fixed cost is denominated in yen, the coefficients can thus be read in terms of yen per unit change in covariate.\footnote{This is very close to the normalization used in Table 4. One hour of additional walking time is approximately equivalent to ¥0.2, or about the cost of a gallon of rice.} We use the same dataset as in Column VI of Table 4 for subsequent tables, and all results are thus based on a comparison of the actually observed partition with 3990 alternative partitions.

Table 5 reports estimates from the “smoothed maximum score” estimator of Equation 20, based on Assumption 2. Geographic distance has a slightly larger coefficient than in Table 4. Fewer variables are statistically significant in Column VII, although most are significant if entered one at a time. The general conclusion is the same as Table 4: the coefficient on geographic distance is much larger, relative to its standard deviation, than any of the other variables.\footnote{In this and subsequent tables, the coefficient on fishing is much smaller than in Table 4. Most of the villages in the dataset have few if any fishermen, while a few are very dependent on fish. This covariate more clearly violates the uniformity in Assumption 1.a than other covariates, which may explain why it is the only one to have an order of magnitude difference in the estimates.}
Table 5: Parameter Estimates (Smoothed Maximum Score)

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Num. obs. | 3990 | 3990 | 3990 | 3990 | 3990 | 3990 | 3990 | 3990 |

\*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.05
Table 6: Parameter Estimates (Minimum Distance)

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***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05
Table 7: Parameter Estimates (Moment Inequalities)

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*p < 0.05
Table 6 reports estimates from the “minimum distance” estimator of Equation 22, based on Assumption 3. Results here are broadly the same as in Tables 4 and 5, although statistical significance levels are lower. Unsurprisingly, statistical significance decreases as weaker assumptions are employed in estimation. We do not report results for a column with all variables included: all the coefficients except for distance become insignificant for most specifications beyond Column VII, and optimizing the objective function becomes increasingly difficult.

Table 7 reports estimates from the “moment inequalities” estimator of Equation 23, based on Assumption 4. With only distance included, the confidence set includes the coefficient estimates in Tables 4 - 6. Including other variables, however, causes problems: confidence sets for the distance coefficient become unbounded in two cases, and include zero in one other case. If it is already known that Column I is an appropriate specification, then the results in this table are useful. However, for exploratory analysis, Table 7 is basically useless: Column V, for example, shows that differences in the lord that ruled the villages during the feudal period is enough to satisfy all the moment inequalities generated from Equation 23, without resorting to geographic distance at all. In the absence of good instruments for all the covariates being considered, it is difficult to use moment inequalities to estimate more complicated specifications than the single covariate in Column I. The results in Column I, however, are useful, because they confirm that the estimates of the importance of walking distance, relative to fixed cost, obtained in Tables 4 - 6, are plausible. Column I also suggests that other reasonable values for the coefficient on distance would be ones that place relatively more importance on distance: previous estimates are near the upper end of the confidence set in Column I, and thus it might be useful to check values closer to the lower end as well.

To evaluate model fit, the optimal partition for the social planner can be calculated, based on the parameter estimates. Appendix Figures 24 and 25 show these results.

5 Counterfactual Simulations

Suppose that, instead of centralized mergers, individual feudal villages had been allowed to decide independently how to arrange themselves into municipalities. With approximately 1000 players in the coalition formation game, there would be approximately $2^{1000}$ potential coalitions. It is thus not computationally feasible to enumerate all the coalitions that could potentially form.

For coalition $m'$ to be a blocking coalition for the partition $\pi$, it must be the case that $u_{im'} < u_{im}$ for all $i$ in $m'$. For a given $\pi$, we are interested in finding such an $m'$, or proving that none exists and thus $\pi$ is in the core. Rearranging Equation 2 and substituting it into
Equation 3, we obtain

\[ u_{im'} = \beta_1 \frac{\sum_{i' \in m'} \ell_{ii'} y_{i'}}{\sum_{i' \in m'} y_{i'}} + \beta_2 \frac{y_i (\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 \sum_{i' \in m'} p_{i'})}{\sum_{i' \in m'} y_{i'}}. \]  

(24)

Multiplying both sides by \( \frac{1}{y_i} \sum_{i' \in m'} y_{i'} \), we express the constraint \( u_{im'} \) as

\[ u_i \sum_{i' \in m'} y_{i'} < \beta_1 \sum_{i' \in m'} \ell_{ii'} y_{i'} + \beta_2 (\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 \sum_{i' \in m'} p_{i'}). \]  

(25)

Now let \( z \) be a vector of binary variables of length \( N \), with \( z_i = 1 \) if \( i \in m' \), and zero otherwise. In Inequality 25, the expression \( \sum_{i' \in m'} y_{i'} \) can then be rewritten as \( \sum_{i' \in m'} z_{i'} y_{i'} \). The only variable in Inequality 25 that is not known is \( z \), and the inequality is linear in \( z \). Consider the following set of (pairs of) disjunctive constraints:

\[ \forall i \text{ either Inequality 25 holds or } z_i = 0. \]  

(26)

This is one pair of constraints per player, for a total of \( N \) pairs of constraints.

The problem of finding a coalition \( m' \) that is a blocking coalition for the partition \( \pi \) is thus equivalent to the problem of finding a vector \( z \) that satisfies the restriction given in (26). A problem in this form can be solved by commercial solvers. Although in theory the problem has NP complexity, in practice, and with the actual data, solutions can be obtained rapidly even with approximately 1000 players. We use CPLEX, which considers this problem to be a binary program with “indicator constraints”\(^49\).

Any given partition \( \pi \) may have many blocking coalitions. We configure the problem of finding a blocking coalition as a maximization problem rather than a feasibility problem, by adding a slack variable \( t \) to Inequality 25 and maximizing the slack. The selected blocking coalition is then the output of

\[
\arg\max_{m'} \max_{t>0} t \\
\text{s.t. } \forall i \in m', \ w_i t < -u_{i\pi} \frac{\sum_{i' \in m'} y_{i'}}{y_i} + \beta_1 \sum_{i' \in m'} \ell_{ii'} y_{i'} + \beta_2 (\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 \sum_{i' \in m'} p_{i'})
\]

where \( w \) is a vector of weights. If \( w_i \) is relatively high, the selected blocking coalition will increase \( i \)'s payoff by more.

\(^49\)From a computational perspective, presolving the problem with about 1000 players is computationally costly. We thus first check sub-problems for each county in Gifu. Only if none of these have a blocking coalition do we check the whole problem. This reduces dramatically the amount of time spent in presolve.
Data: $N, y, p, \ell, \beta, \gamma, w$

Result: A core partition $\pi^*$ (or loop forever)

Arbitrarily assign players to a starting partition $\pi_1$;
Iteration count $j = 1$;

while there is a blocking coalition $m'$ for partition $\pi_j$ do
  Identify “affected” coalitions, $A = \{m|m \in \pi_j, \exists i \in m \text{ s.t. } i \in m'\}$;
  Identify “residual” players, $R = \{i|i \in m \in A, i \notin m'\}$;
  if $R \neq \emptyset$ then
    Recursion: find a core partition $\pi^{R*}$ using only players $R$;
    $\pi_{j+1} = (\pi_j \setminus A) \cup \{m'\} \cup \pi^{R*}$;
  else
    $\pi_{j+1} = (\pi_j \setminus A) \cup \{m'\}$;
  end
  $j = j + 1$;
end
$\pi^* = \pi_j$;

Algorithm 1: Core Partition via Myopic Deviations

Algorithm 1 attempts to find a core partition by successively generating blocking coalitions using (27). Nomenclature and some ideas regarding recursion are taken from Ray and Vohra [1997]. In this algorithm, the binary program to find a blocking coalition appears in the inner loop.

The coalition formation game considered in this paper contains “minimal inaccessible coalition configurations” as described in Papai [2003], and thus the no-cycle results from the two-sided matching literature, such as Roth and Vate [1990], do not apply. There is thus the possibility that Algorithm 1 will loop forever, and Arkin, Bae, Efrat, Okamoto, Mitchell, and Polishchuk [2009] provide a specific example of an empty core in a setup very similar to that of Section 1. Using our data and parameter estimates, however, the algorithm always terminates.\textsuperscript{50} By using different weights $w$ in (27) across runs of the algorithm, we pick out different paths of myopic deviations, and thus different core partitions.\textsuperscript{51}

\textsuperscript{50}Drèze et al. [2008] consider a coalition formation game with transfers, and show theoretically that the core is “almost” non-empty. This matches with the empirical finding here that the core is non-empty in the case without transfers. Computational difficulty results in Arkin et al. [2009] regarding the existence of polynomial time algorithms suggest a possible explanation for why the algorithm used is computationally feasible.

\textsuperscript{51}Fully solving this optimization problem dramatically lengthens the time required to find the next blocking coalition, and does not appear to improve the time required to find a core partition. Stopping upon finding the first (integer feasible) solution results in different runs of the algorithm producing solutions, as desired. A major advantage of this approach is that for some values of the weights the algorithm terminates quickly, while for others it does not terminate within the maximum allowable job time of the computer system used.
Table 8: Simulation Results: Number of Municipalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\beta_1$</th>
<th>social planner</th>
<th>equal tax base</th>
<th>actual tax base</th>
<th>no variable cost</th>
<th>subsidized fixed cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>268.2</td>
<td>409.9</td>
<td>255.8</td>
<td>724.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.0)</td>
<td>(2.7)</td>
<td>(3.4)</td>
<td>(1.0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>320.2</td>
<td>459.0</td>
<td>304.9</td>
<td>766.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.7)</td>
<td>(2.2)</td>
<td>(3.3)</td>
<td>(1.0)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>396.0</td>
<td>540.6</td>
<td>382.8</td>
<td>831.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.8)</td>
<td>(1.9)</td>
<td>(2.8)</td>
<td>(0.9)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estimated standard deviations of partitions within solution set are given in parentheses were there are multiple solutions to the coalition formation game. The social planner’s optimal partition is unique, as is the decentralized outcome where there is no distance cost.

We run this algorithm based on parameters from Column I, Table 7. As we are dealing with set identification rather than point identification, we consider three values of distance cost $\beta_1$: -0.06, -0.08, and -0.12. We then run 100 counterfactual simulations using Algorithm 1 with each of these values of $\beta$, with randomized weights $w$ drawn from a uniform distribution. We discuss an alternative algorithm in Appendix D, which yields similar results.

To compute the social planner’s optimal partition, we use an approach based on Yigit, Aydin, and Turkbey [2006]. Appendix Figures 24 and 25 show the results of this optim-

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52 The justification for using this column comes from Tables 4 - 6.
53 These counterfactual simulations are performed using the observed data, from the GKCR and other sources. However, according to the econometric model presented in Section 2, this data is measured with error. Thus according to the model, the counterfactual simulations are being performed on a counterfactual Gifu prefecture, that has characteristics that are slightly noisier than the real Gifu prefecture. There is one case where the counterfactual simulation is correct, at least asymptotically: if the distribution of characteristics of players is a maximum entropy distribution, then adding measurement error does not change this distribution. In this case, then, simulations based on the observed characteristics of the players return (asymptotically) the same results as simulations based on the true characteristics of the players. The most relevant maximum entropy distribution is the following: players are uniformly distributed on the surface of a sphere. Here as the number of players becomes large, isotropic noise will not change the distribution. The players in Gifu prefecture are somewhat close to uniformly distributed, and we ignore the fact that they are distributed on only one small part of a sphere.
54 This algorithm uses simulated annealing as an inner optimization loop, and uses a genetic algorithm
Table 9: Simulation Results: Inefficiency (¥1000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\beta_1$</th>
<th>social planner</th>
<th>equal tax base</th>
<th>actual no variable cost</th>
<th>subsidized fixed cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.7)</td>
<td>(1.6)</td>
<td>(0.3)</td>
<td>(1.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.6)</td>
<td>(1.2)</td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.5)</td>
<td>(0.8)</td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Estimated standard deviations of partitions within solution set are given in parentheses were there are multiple solutions to the coalition formation game. The social planner’s optimal partition is unique, as is the decentralized outcome where there is no distance cost.

We can now compare the partitions that are predicted to arise under a decentralized jurisdiction formation process to those that a central planner is predicted to select.

Results are shown in Tables 8 and 9. The rows of these tables show different values of $\beta_1$ used to perform the simulations. For reference, we include as the first row the case where there is no heterogeneity cost ($\beta_1 = 0$). This is a case discussed in Farrell and Scotchmer [1988]: from the social planner’s perspective, the grand coalition is optimal, but differences in tax base will lead to partitions with multiple coalitions in the decentralized case.\(^{55}\)

Column I in Table 8 shows the partition that would chosen by the social planner. By definition, this partition is reported with an inefficiency of zero in Table 9. The remaining columns describe the results of a decentralized coalition formation process under various conditions.

Column II of Tables 8 and 9 shows the characteristics of partitions that arise if the per capita tax base, $y/p$, were set to be the same for all players in the game.\(^{56}\) This is the as an outer optimization loop for restarting the annealing algorithm at different initial points. The overall approach is thus that of annealing with multiple restarts, using a particular method of choosing the starting points. One advantage of this method is that the outer optimization loop is easily parallelizable. The optimization problem here is also of NP difficulty. Barros [1998] provides an introduction to these issues.\(^{55}\) For this row, we find partitions based on the recursive algorithm provided by Farrell and Scotchmer [1988]. For all other rows, we use Algorithm 1.\(^{56}\) The number used for the per capita tax base in this case is $\sum_{i=1}^{N} y_i / \sum_{i=1}^{N} p_i$. As discussed in Appendix I, this is approximately 1.
case where there is “horizontal” (geographic) heterogeneity, but no “vertical” (tax base per capita) heterogeneity. We see that even in this case the partitions that arise as a result of the decentralized coalition formation process are not exactly the same as the one that would be chosen by the social planner. We also verify that the social planner’s partition is not part of the core. However, the partitions that are formed only have slightly more mergers than would have been selected by the social planner.

Figure 6 shows one randomly selected core partition from the $\beta_1 = -0.06$ row of Column II. From a qualitative point of view, the coalitions displayed in Figure 6 appear reasonable from the social planner’s perspective: most coalitions are geographically convex, and the cases where this is not true can usually be explained by intervening mountains making the selected coalition structure more reasonable from the perspective of walking distance.

In contrast, Figure 7 shows a random example of the coalition structure that arises in the decentralized coalition formation game in the case where the actual per capita tax base data is used. Statistics for 100 such random partitions are shown in Column III of Tables 8 and 9. In the case where different players have different per capita tax bases, there are about 70% more coalitions than in the partition selected by the social planner. Furthermore, the coalitions that do form are not generally convex in a geographic sense, as those in Figure 6 were.

In Farrell and Scotchmer [1988], in the case where players differ in a vertical characteristic, players wish to merge based on this vertical characteristic, and thus trade off heterogeneity in the horizontal characteristic in exchange for this. In the model in Section 1, however, the same amount in total is being spent on providing services for any configuration involving the same number of coalitions. Thus, this willingness to accept coalition partners that are a worse match on the horizontal characteristic, in exchange for being a better match on the vertical characteristic, is inefficient from a social perspective, at least in the case of the quasilinear utility used in the model in Section 1.

This result is due to the form of the cost of public goods for the data used: there is both a fixed cost that generates efficiencies of scale, as well as a marginal cost that reflects high congestibility. In this environment, adding an additional player who is substantially poorer will increase the tax rate for members of a coalition, and thus a decentralized process results in jurisdictions that are substantially smaller than the social optimum. Given the

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57 The lowest distance cost row is used for visualization because the coalitions that result are larger, and thus patterns are more readily apparent.

58 The walking distance matrix is not isomorphic to a Euclidean distance matrix, and thus it is not possible to represent the walking distance for players in a figure such as Figure 6.
Figure 6: Decentralized mergers with equal per capita tax base

Edges indicate members of the same coalition. Colours are the same within each coalition, but random across coalitions. No players are missing (“off the page”) on the left or right sides of the figure.
Edges indicate members of the same coalition. Colours are the same within each coalition, but random across coalitions. No players are missing (“off the page”) on the left or right sides of the figure.
heterogeneity in income observed in the data, and the apparent cost function for the provision of public goods, decentralization of jurisdiction formation would result in substantial inefficiency. In contrast, in Column II there is no variation in income, and thus tax per capita is equal to the variable cost plus the average fixed cost. In this scenario adding an additional member to a coalition always decreased the tax rate.

An objection could be made that the mergers shown in Figure 7 are unreasonable, and only serve to show that the model of Section 1 is an inappropriate model of municipal mergers. In particular, although geographic adjacency is not shown in Figure 7, it is clear that some of the mergers predicted are not geographically contiguous.\textsuperscript{59} Should any realistic model of municipal mergers really be predicting these sorts of configurations?

Figure 8 shows a set of decentralized municipal mergers that actually occurred in Aomori Prefecture around 2006. These mergers were part of the \textit{Heisei daigappei} set of municipal mergers. The figure shows three geographically discontiguous mergers, involving in total eight geographically contiguous municipalities. In the centralized mergers of the Meiji period, these sorts of arrangements are not observed in the data. Thus, bizarre configurations of the sort shown in Figure 7 can and do occur in reality, and they do so only during decentralized mergers (Heisei) and not centralized ones (Meiji). Furthermore, the qualitative explanation offered for the outcome shown in Figure 8 is also in line with the model in Section 1: the municipalities shown on the map differed substantially in levels of indebtedness and revenue sources, and the observed mergers were the result of an attempt to avoid matching with undesirable but neighbouring municipalities.

The comparison of Figure 7 and Figure 8 suggests that perhaps the model developed in this paper, although intended for the data from the Meiji period, could be used to perform a more general analysis of municipal mergers in Japan. Since the beginning of the modern municipal system described in Appendix I, there have been three waves of mergers: Meiji, Showa, and Heisei. The Meiji mergers were centralized. The Heisei mergers were decentralized, with the national government offering a specific set of financial incentives (including both a “carrot” and a “stick”) in order to encourage municipalities to merge.\textsuperscript{60}

The Showa mergers, however, appeared to have characteristics of both centralized and decentralized mergers. There was substantial involvement of higher levels of government,

\textsuperscript{59}This can be verified by looking at Figure 13 in Appendix I, which shows the geographic adjacencies of the players.

\textsuperscript{60}For a recent discussion of the Heisei mergers in the domestic literature, see Machida [2006]. The general consensus appears to be that mergers occurred democratically, subject to the financial incentives. The “stick” portion of the national government funding formula change in particular appears to have led many small municipalities to participate in mergers. This qualitative discussion agrees with the theoretical results in Weese [2015b] regarding when the “stick” should be used.
Figure 8: Actual decentralized merger outcome, Aomori Prefecture, c. 2006

Source: Geospatial Information Authority of Japan
Map colours indicate members of the same coalition. Japanese text gives the names of pre-merger municipalities (in black) and post-merger municipalities (in colour). Arrows join members of non-contiguous coalitions.
both national and prefectural. At the prefectural level, committees drew up formal merger plans for the entire prefecture. On the other hand, the final mergers had to be approved at the municipal level. One interpretation of this is that the municipal approval was mere window dressing, and municipalities could not refuse to participate in the national government plan. Our simulation results suggest another potential explanation for the seemingly contradictory “both centralized and decentralized” nature of the Showa mergers.

As documented in Appendix I, during the Meiji period there were effectively no transfers from the national government to municipalities, and only extremely limited assistance from prefectures. This allows for the simple model developed in Section 1. After World War II, however, the Shoup Report commissioned by occupation forces recommended revisions to the municipal finance system. This resulted in the *Heikou Koufukin* (later renamed the *Chihou Koufuzei*), a transfer system that would eventually grow to enormous size. Two stylized facts regarding this transfer system are important: during the Showa period, it was widely considered to provide inadequate equalization for capital costs, while in the Heisei period capital costs were seen as overstated, and the system was seen instead as providing inadequate equalization for larger cities.

A stylized version of the transfer system in place throughout the post-war period is that it is based on lump-sum transfers. Previous analysis shows that these transfers can be modelled as a fixed plus variable amount: this is directly related to the fact that the cost of providing services can be modelled in this way. Thus, rewrite the budget constraint of Equation 2 as

\[(\gamma_1 - T_1) + (\gamma_2 - T_2) \sum_{i \in m} p_i = \tau_m \sum_{i \in m} y_i\] (28)

where \(T_1\) is the fixed transfer amount, and \(T_2\) the variable transfer amount, depending on the amount of municipal services that need to be provided. In Equation 28, a transfer scheme of this sort, from the perspective of the municipalities, is equivalent to a change in the fixed and variable costs to

\[\tilde{\gamma}_1 = \gamma_1 - T_1\]

\[\tilde{\gamma}_2 = \gamma_2 - T_2\] (29) (30)

Thus, to simulate the results that would occur in a decentralized set of mergers with a certain

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61 In the case of Aomori Prefecture, these plans were actually based on a formal matching model, complete with a payoff structure and an approximation algorithm.

62 The details of the system are quite complicated, and subsidies were also present. The appendix of Weese [2015b] provides a brief English-language description.
equalization transfer scheme, we need only to change the parameters $\gamma_1$ and $\gamma_2$ to $\tilde{\gamma}_1$ and $\tilde{\gamma}_2$ when running the decentralized simulations, but then retain the original $\gamma_1$ when calculating the optimal partition from the perspective of the social planner.\textsuperscript{63} We can thus ask what the effect of an equalization system of various sorts might have been on municipal mergers, by asking what the core of the decentralized coalition formation game would look like under different parameters for the cost function.

Suppose that there were no variable cost: $c(P) = \gamma_1$ for all populations $P$. This is a situation often considered in the theoretical literature, and corresponds very roughly to the case of the equalization payments in the Showa period. Column IV of Table 8 shows that in this case the decentralized partitions are very close to the partition that would have been chosen by the social planner.

The intuition for this result is that, with only a fixed cost of providing services, adding any member to a coalition will decrease the tax rate that needs to be charged. If there were no horizontal (geographic) differentiation, this case would correspond exactly to that of Farrell and Scotchmer [1988], where there is no inefficiency. The presence of geographic heterogeneity creates the potential for inefficiency, but empirically this is not severe. Thus, in an environment in which public goods can be provided with only a fixed cost, it appears that decentralized mergers are unlikely to cause any particular problems.

This result provides a potential explanation for the contradictory nature of the Showa mergers, which were apparently both centralized and decentralized at the same time.\textsuperscript{64} With an equalization system of the sort in place during the Showa period, decentralized coalitions were very similar to those that the social planner would have selected.\textsuperscript{65} Thus, during the Showa period, there was close to no contradiction between the centrally planned merger pattern, and one that municipalities would have wanted to carry out.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{63}For calculating the socially optimal partition, $\gamma_2$ is irrelevant, as discussed above. It matters in the decentralized case because higher variable costs will result in greater tax payments and thus more interest in finding merger partners with substantial tax bases but few people to consume services.

\textsuperscript{64}Tanaka and Kadotami [1963] summarizes the view of the Showa mergers as centralized, citing Kawaguchi [1960a], Kawaguchi [1960b], Kawaguchi [1961], Oshima [1958], Oshima [1959], and Fukutake [1959]. Steiner [1965], however, gives a case study where local politics played a key role in the merger process. More recent research includes Ichikawa [2011], who emphasizes the importance of both local governments and the national government in the merger process, and Arakaki [2010], who argues that the large number of municipal splits is evidence of central control.

\textsuperscript{65}One might wonder, in fact, what the “best” partitions might look like in Column IV. It is difficult to modify Algorithm 1 to produce partitions that are desirable from a social perspective, because choosing the “best” myopic deviation in this case involves a non-linear objective and is thus computationally costly. Using the Dinkelbach [1967] approach is possible, but it appears that the increase in computation time is not rewarded by partitions that are particularly good from the social planner’s perspective. This provides suggestive evidence that there may be no partitions that are anomalously good.

\textsuperscript{66}One might imagine, for example, the central planner began by creating a partition. This was either then modified to ensure that it corresponded to a core partition, or (more likely, given the anecdotal evidence)
Now, consider a transfer scheme of the sort in use in the Heisei period. As documented by DeWit [2002] and others, the transfer system by this point had changed into one that was exceedingly generous with respect to capital investments, which were large for smaller municipalities, but did not really adequately compensate municipalities for the variable costs incurred. The extreme case of such a transfer scheme would be one in which the fixed cost is completely subsidized, in which case no players would be interested in any mergers in the decentralized case. In order to cause decentralized mergers to occur, the national government offered a set of financial incentives, both rewarding those municipalities that chose to participate in mergers, and penalizing those that did not. In an extremely rough sense, these incentives correspond to municipalities becoming responsible for a portion of the fixed cost. We calculate the fraction of the fixed cost, based on calculations in Weese [2015b], and determine that the incentive corresponds to roughly two thirds of the fixed cost. We then consider a set of decentralized mergers, with the municipalities only considering this fraction of the fixed cost.

Results are shown in Column V of Table 8. The number of coalitions is far higher than in any of the other columns, and indeed reaches the resolution of the data, in the sense that most municipalities remain as singletons, with only the smallest participating in mergers at all.\textsuperscript{67}

It thus appears that, in contrast to the equalization payments offered during the Showa period, the type of subsidy provided during the Heisei period results in substantial problems when considering decentralized mergers. The intuition for this is fairly straightforward: a transfer payment scheme equivalent to part of the fixed cost $\gamma_1$ reduces the incentive to merge from the perspective of the municipality. In contrast, a transfer payment scheme equivalent to part of the variable cost $\gamma_2$ reduces the importance of the differences in per capita tax base. Thus, the former case results in municipalities choosing a decentralized merger pattern that is even less desirable, from the perspective of the social planner, while the latter case results in mergers that are quite close to the social optimal.\textsuperscript{68}

A separate question is what results would occur if there were vertical (income) heterogeneity, but no horizontal (geographic) heterogeneity. This case corresponds exactly to the model in Farrell and Scotchmer [1988]. Here the socially optimal result is for the grand coalition to form, but the presence of the variable cost means that players will minimize the small number of reluctant municipalities were bludgeoned into accepting the proposed partition, even though blocking coalitions existed. An explanation of this sort does not appear anywhere in the literature, but instead arises from the simulations performed based on the model in this paper.\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{67}It is still reasonable to compare these results to others: see Appendix E for details.

\textsuperscript{68}In the official government evaluation of the Heisei mergers (“Heisei no Gappei” no Hyouka-Kenshou-Banseki), the reluctance of municipalities to merge is noted. In contrast, in the Showa mergers, the number of municipalities was reduced by 6152, very close to the targeted reduction of 6273 [Yoshitomi, 1960].
their tax rate by avoiding forming coalitions with poorer players. Empirical estimates here
give a total of about 60 coalitions forming. Thus, in one sense the inefficiency resulting
from vertical heterogeneity only is dramatically larger than that resulting from horizontal
heterogeneity only. However, given the cost function, if the number of players is increased,
with the new players having per capita incomes drawn from the same income distribution,
the number of municipalities will increase at a slower rate than the number of players. Thus,
asymptotically, the per capita inefficiency will fall to zero as the number of players becomes
large. In contrast, suppose that the asymptotics considered for the case of horizontal het-
erogeneity are that additional players are always added on the “edge”, and the game thus
expands across the plane while maintaining a constant density of players. In this case the
level of inefficiency will not decrease as more players are added. Thus, with this asymptotic
interpretation, the inefficiency resulting from only vertical heterogeneity eventually disap-
pears, while the inefficiency resulting from only horizontal heterogeneity is low but constant
in the number of players.

In order to obtain substantial amounts of inefficiency empirically, then, both horizon-
tal and vertical heterogeneity are required. In addition, the cost function must include a
component that looks like a fixed cost (to provide a incentive to form coalitions), and a
component that looks like a variable cost (to provide an incentive to keep relatively poorer
players out of the coalition). This situation corresponds to the situation that appears to
actually be the case empirically, and thus it appears that decentralized mergers, had they
been implemented, would have resulted in substantial amounts of inefficiency. However, as
theoretical models with both vertical and horizontal heterogeneity appear to be very difficult
to solve [Gregorini, 2009], the empirical results suggest that it may be difficult to capture
the empirically relevant sources of inefficiency in a tractable theoretical framework.

A quantitative interpretation of the amount of inefficiency displayed in Table 9 is chal-
lenging, because local government during the Meiji period began as a very small portion of
GDP but then grew quickly as Japan industrialized. Table 10 in the Appendix suggests that
the units used in Table 9 correspond roughly to the annual salary of a senior government
official. The total expenditures on police by Gifu prefecture Table 14 in the Appendix is
roughly equal to the inefficiency reported in Column V of Table 9. Thus, the calculated
amounts of inefficiency are important when considered in the context of the size of Meiji-era
local governments, even though they are not large in absolute terms.

An alternative interpretation could be obtained by scaling up the inefficiency reported
in Table 9 by the difference in expenditures on public services between the Meiji period
and the present. The fixed costs $\gamma_1$ represent 12% of the estimated expenditures on public
services in Gifu, and the inefficiency reported in Column V of Table 9 is equivalent to about
a doubling of this component, or a little more than 10% of local government spending. Local government spending as a percentage of GDP is difficult to calculate due to the extremely large transfer system, but if it were in the range of 15-25% then inefficiency would represent 2-3% of GDP. Thus, the amount of inefficiency calculated may be large, but this depends on the method used to compare it to total output. 69

6 Conclusion

In this paper we estimated parameters based on a set of centralized mergers assumed to have been chosen by a utilitarian social planner. The number of cases where this sort of assumption is reasonable is likely quite low. We then showed how to use these parameters to conduct counterfactual simulations of a decentralized coalition formation game. This latter portion of the paper appears to be more generally applicable, as other phenomenon can and have been modelled as the outcome of a coalition formation game without transfers.

Ethnic or linguistic groups, for example, could be considered in this framework, and have recently received extensive theoretical analysis (e.g. Ginsburgh and Weber [2011]). Empirical analysis of choice of language or ethnicity has often focussed on individual decisions, 70 but reduced-form results such as those in Michalopoulos [2012] suggest that analysis of identity formation at the group level might also be informative. Weese [2015a] provides an early attempt at this sort of analysis.

The computational technique used in this paper is only useful in the case where core partitions exist, and thus could not be used to analyze cases where the core is empty. Furthermore, Algorithm 1 is only useful in the case where myopic deviations will generally lead to a core partition. On the other hand, the use of linear inequalities is not as restrictive as it may first appear. Barros [1998] and others describe methods for expressing more complex restrictions in linear form by generating additional variables. Although using this approach may currently be computationally challenging, mixed integer programming algorithms have seen enormous improvements in speed in recent years [Bixby, 2012]. Combined with improvements in hardware performance, simulation of at least approximate versions of models with non-linear payoff structures may soon become feasible.

69Extending this result to the case of national boundaries is challenging because the degree of inefficiency depends on the cost function for providing national public goods, for which no good estimates appear to be available. Thus it appears to be difficult to draw firm conclusions about the severity of the potential problem at the international level. If the cost function for national public goods is similar to the cost function for local public goods, though, the inefficiency may be economically significant.

Some interesting relative conclusions, however, can be drawn from the results in this paper. For example, given the importance of differences in per capita tax base to the inefficiency results, the case of Crimea (poorer than the rest of the Ukraine) choosing to join Russia may actually be less worrisome than, for example, relatively richer areas (such as Catalonia) seeking to leave relatively poorer areas (such as the rest of Spain).

70See Clingingsmith [2014] for example, or Jia and Persson [2015] and the references therein.
References


A Relationship to Herfindahl/Fragmentation Index

Notation is easier when considering only one municipality, and thus we will suppress $m$ subscripts throughout this section and take all sums over only the players in the municipality being considered. Suppose that players can be divided into discrete types, with distance $\ell_{ii'}$ being 1 if $i$ and $i'$ are the same types and 0 if they are different. Index types by $t$, and let $t(i)$ denote the type of player $i$. Let $s_t$ be the share of players in municipality $m$ that are type $t$, weighted by income:

$$s_t = \frac{\sum_i y_i \delta_{t(i), t}}{Y_m}. $$

Here $\delta_{t(i), t(i')}$ is the Kronecker delta, equal to 1 if $i$ and $i'$ are the same type, and 0 otherwise. With this notation, the relationship between $\delta$ and $\ell$ is $\delta_{t(i), t(i')} = 1 - \ell_{ii'}$.\(^{71}\) Let $H$ denote the Herfindahl index of municipality $m$ with respect to types, weighted by income, and $Y$ the total income of municipality $m$. Then

$$H = \sum_t s_t^2 = \sum_i \frac{y_i}{Y}s_{t(i)} = \sum_i \frac{y_i}{Y} \sum_{i'} \frac{y_{i'} \delta_{t(i), t(i')}}{Y} = \sum_i \sum_{i'} \frac{(1 - \ell_{ii'})y_i y_{i'}}{Y^2} = \sum_i \frac{y_i}{Y} - \sum_i \sum_{i'} \frac{\ell_{ii'} y_i y_{i'}}{Y^2} = 1 - \sum_i \sum_{i'} \frac{\ell_{ii'} y_i y_{i'}}{Y^2}. $$

Multiply this by $Y$, and the second term is equal to the inner portion of the first term in Equation 5. The outer summation in Equation 5 takes an average of heterogeneity over municipalities, weighted by income.\(^{72}\) With discrete types, the average distance considered is thus equal to one minus the average Herfindahl index. This is the fragmentation index generally used in work on ethnic or linguistic fragmentation.

\(^{71}\)This notation is helpful for intuition, because $\delta$ can be thought of as describing an $N$ by $N$ matrix with entries of 0 or 1. Rearranging rows and columns of this matrix would yield a block diagonal matrix, with each block corresponding to a type. The fraction of entries that are in block $t$ is $s_t^2$, and thus the average entry is $\sum_t s_t^2$.

\(^{72}\)This weighting accounts for why the $(1/Y)$ in Equation 5 is not squared. The total income of all municipalities together is constant regardless of partition, and is thus absorbed into $\beta_1$. 

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B  Plausibility of “Standard” Instruments

Moment inequality models make minimal distributional assumptions regarding the idiosyncratic shock, and thus rely heavily on instruments in order to obtain an acceptably small identified set. Many of the types of instruments generally used, however, appear inapplicable to the data used in this paper. The implausibility of these instruments is not a special feature of the particular data used, but rather appears to be a general characteristic of political jurisdiction formation data.

Specifically, “lagged variable” instruments are implausible because recent innovations are not of particular interest: political boundaries are changed rarely, and any lagged measurement will include a correlated error of exactly the sort that needs to be avoided. “Neighbouring market” instruments turn out to be extremely weak, because even when clearly defined “markets” for mergers do exist, most variation is within market, as each merger market generally includes both a central city and its rural hinterland. This phenomenon is illustrated in Table 1 of Weese [2015b], where a division of prefectures into “rural”, “mixed”, and “metropolitan” results in just over 75% of prefectures being classified as “mixed”. Finally, geographic or climatic variables are non-excludable. In the dataset considered, the central planner was explicitly directed to consider geographic distance, and casual inspection of any random selection of maps suggests that the importance of geography in Gifu is not an unusual feature in the design of political boundaries.

A potential objection here is that the difficulty in finding instruments means that researchers in this area simply need to work harder in order to find a dataset that does have appropriate instrumental variables. The problem is that both the number and size of datasets concerning political jurisdictions is sharply limited. Even large countries sometimes only have a few thousand jurisdictions at the lowest level, and there are simply not that many large countries in the world. Randomized experiments are basically unheard of, and quasi-experimental variation is difficult to find because the policy decisions made often result in precisely the sort of endogeneity that needs to be avoided. It is important to develop econometric approaches suitable for the type of data actually available.

C  Externalities

The observed pattern of mergers shown in Figure 2 is difficult to explain using a model where the benefit of a larger jurisdictions is the internalization of externalities. Externalities are generally treated as having increasing marginal damage, or equivalently, decreasing marginal benefit. Plausible externalities, such as pollution, traffic, or the exhaustion of common
pool resources, would generally be observed at higher levels in areas with higher population density. Thus, the benefit of internalization should be higher in areas with higher population density, and larger jurisdictions should thus be observed in these areas. On the other hand, in areas with lower population density, the damage from these externalities is more limited, and thus there is not the same need for large jurisdictions.

The observed pattern of jurisdictions in Figure 2 is the opposite of what would be expected based on the externality model just described, as jurisdictions have the smallest area in those regions with the highest population density. Furthermore, Japan was overwhelmingly rural during this period: while population density varies substantially depending on terrain, there are only two locations in Gifu that could reasonably be considered to be cities, consisting of less than 10% of the population. The lack of large urban agglomerations further reduces the number of potential externalities that need to be considered. In rural areas, the only plausible spillovers between municipalities are related to public works: irrigation that uses scarce water, levees to protect against flooding, or roads. We observe, however, that jurisdictions have smaller smaller surface area in the densely populated areas, and cover larger areas in the mountainous rural regions. A model based on externalities thus appears inappropriate both because of a lack of plausible externalities, and because the major prediction of such a model does not appear to be present in the partition that was actually chosen by the Meiji central government.

D Alternative Computational Method

An alternative method finding core partitions relies on the exhaustive enumeration of potential coalitions. In this case, restrictions need to be imposed so that this enumeration is computationally feasible. Specifically, consider only coalitions that are geographically contiguous, and consist of 11 players or less. This covers the vast majority of actual mergers. As an additional modification for computational simplicity, eliminate the smallest players: iteratively merge those shizen son with very low population with the neighbouring shizen son that has the closest koku rating per capita. This reduces the number of players to about 1080, but more importantly reduces the number of mergers with a large number of players, such that considering mergers with up to 11 players covers virtually all of the potentially stable coalitions.

Furthermore, rather than considering the coalition formation game as a whole, with about a thousand players, break the game into geographically contiguous units with about 40 players each. This corresponds to the standard IO setup of considering geographic “markets” for goods. To ensure that these restrictions themselves do not bias the results, the socially
optimal partition will be computed using this same restricted set of coalitions.

To compute the core of each coalition formation game, the same approach based on random myopic deviations will be used. As the number of potential partitions is finite, a properly randomized approach will eventually find all partitions in the core. Ensuring reasonable performance is difficult, however, because of the possibility of cycles of myopic deviations. A brute force approach to avoid cycles is thus used, following Algorithm 1, but using exhaustive enumeration rather than mixed integer programming to find blocking coalitions. The core of the decentralized coalition formation game that results is never empty, and while occasionally a singleton, it generally consists of a number of partitions, all corresponding to roughly the same level of social welfare. The difference between the best and worst element of the core is minimal, corresponding to less than the fixed cost of one additional municipality, in games where twenty municipalities are forming on average.

E  Smaller Players

One might wonder whether this means that the actual inefficiency would be even higher, if only the size of the players were smaller, and thus it were possible for an even finer partition to emerge. It turns out that this appears to not be the case.

Suppose that we wished to consider the “same” coalition formation game, except with smaller players. One way to do this, albeit in only an approximate sense, would be to start by halving the distance cost (e.g. $\beta_1 = -0.03$ instead of $\beta_1 = -0.06$), which is equivalent to halving all the distances $\ell$. Then, in order to retain population density at its original value, we reduce all the populations (and koku ratings) of players by $(1/2)^2 = 1/4$. This produces a “zoomed in” version of the original configuration.

If the number of players is large, and their distribution fractal, then this “zoomed in” configuration has the same distribution as the original configuration. The resulting number of coalitions in core partitions should thus be the same, except in the case where the core partitions in the initial game were anomalously large because the initial player sizes were too big. We find, however, that this effect is in fact not particularly important: “zoomed in” core partitions with $\beta_1 = -0.03$ have 210% more coalitions than the social optimum, compared to the corresponding initial case of $\beta_1 = -0.06$ with 180% more coalitions. Thus, it appears that with the initial data we are calculating roughly the right amount of inefficiency.
F Data Construction

This appendix describes the exact method used to construct each of the variables listed in Table 3.

F.1 Points

If a village has no “place” points within its boundaries, then we use the location of a train station, in the very small number of cases that one exists.\(^73\) If a village still has no points, we continue with gazetteer points related to municipality names, which are less attractive because the geocoding for these do not appear to be as accurate as for the “place” points. We continue in the same fashion for schools, companies, structures, and plains. In all cases, the first item shown in the “order of use” legend in Figure 11 to have any points inside the feudal village boundaries is used as the location of that village. If this item has multiple points within the feudal village boundaries, then we keep track of all of these.

\(^73\)These are less desirable, because were generally built after the municipal merger period, and only show up in the gazetteer because some of the maps on which it is based come from the early 20th century. There are only 9 train stations in the gazetteer.
Figure 10: Toyota County, Ibaraki Prefecture
There are 59 feudal villages for which no points are found via this method. After manual inspection, 29 of these are cases where an appropriately named point is located just outside of the village polygon: we assign these points to the appropriate village. In the remaining 30 cases, we use the geographic centroid of the polygon for the location.

Figure 9 shows a histogram of the number of points per feudal village. For a majority of feudal villages, we have exactly one point associated with the village. In a small number of cases, there are a dozen or more points associated with a single feudal village.

F.2 Distance

Straight-line distance is calculated using the great-circle distance formula, assuming that the earth is a sphere. For feudal villages represented by more than one point, this distance is calculated as the average distance across all relevant points. That is, if $J_i$ is the set of points associated with feudal village $i$, and $J_{i'}$ the set of points associated with feudal village $i'$, then the straight-line distance $\ell_{ii'}^{D.S}$ is calculated as

$$\ell_{ii'}^{D.S} = \frac{1}{|J_i||J_{i'}|} \sum_{j \in J_i} \sum_{j' \in J_{i'}} \ell_{jj'}^{D.S}$$

(32)

where, with some abuse of notation, $\ell_{jj'}^{D.S}$ is the straight line distance between point $j$ and point $j'$. The result of repeated application of Equation 32 is a distance matrix $\ell^{D.S}$ containing a straight line distance $\ell_{ii'}$ for each pair of feudal villages $i$ and $i'$. To create $X_{D.S}$, we then use Equation 9, with distances $\ell_{ii'}$ taken from the matrix $\ell^{D.S}$.

For expositional purposes, we calculate a histogram of the straight line distances between adjacent feudal villages: these are $\ell_{ii'}^{D.S}$, with the $(i, i')$ pairs used corresponding to the edges shown in Figure 13. Figure 14 reports these distances, with the modal distance being a bit less than 2km, and some distances being substantially longer.

Straight line distance is likely inappropriate in the case of Gifu, however, because much of the prefecture is mountainous, and thus the actual path used to travel between two villages would not be a straight line, but rather a more complicated route that minimizes elevation changes. For these calculations, we do not consider data on the road network in place during this period: this network was relatively primitive, and we assume that there are walking tracks located wherever our algorithm calculates that people will be travelling. Although trains were being introduced during this period, they were used for longer distance journeys, and are not relevant for distance calculations between a feudal village and its neighbour, or the next village over. Thus, we consider walking as the only mode of transport.
Figure 11: Gazetteer Point Data

Figure 12: Points Used from Gazetteer
Given the mountainous nature of the prefecture, we assume that the major determinant of walking time is elevation change.\textsuperscript{74} We use digital elevation data from the Geospatial Information Authority of Japan, at 10 meter grid square resolution. Figure 16 shows this elevation data.

To calculate walking time between two points based on this elevation data, we use the Fontanari [2000] implementation of Dijkstra’s shortest-path algorithm, applied to a raster version of the elevation data.\textsuperscript{75} The walking time returned is anisotropic: the cost of walking uphill is not simply equal to the benefit of walking downhill. Thus, the shortest path to a destination may be different from the shortest path returning from it. We use the roundtrip distance, following both of these paths, divided by two.\textsuperscript{76} In the case where feudal villages are associated with multiple points, the approach in Equation 32 is used.

Figure 15 reports the walking distances for adjacent feudal villages. The units used here are 1000s of seconds, because walking speed is approximately 1km per 1000sec, and thus with these units coefficient estimates will be of roughly comparable magnitudes when using the straight line distance data and the walking distance data. According to the figure, the modal walking time to an adjacent village is a bit less than two hours.

\textsuperscript{74}Rivers in Gifu are often seasonal, and generally small. A qualitative inspection of boundaries shows that they do not appear to follow rivers in a systematic way, and a preliminary quantitative analysis using GMM and the actual location of the boundary between two adjacent municipalities appeared to confirm this. We do not report these results because the standard errors were very high, and the econometric model used differs substantially from that presented in Section 2.

\textsuperscript{75}This is the “walking distance” function \texttt{r.walk} in the GRASS GIS package. Parameters are left at their default values, which correspond to the Aitken [1977] and Langmuir [1984] adjustments to the Naismith [1892] walking time function.

\textsuperscript{76}One is reminded of hiking trails that split at certain points, offering both a steeper and a gentler route.
Each vertex is a player, and edges indicate geographic adjacency.
Figure 14: Straight-line Distance

Figure 15: Walking Distance
Dark brown indicates low elevation, white higher elevations, and green highest. In mountainous regions, low elevations tend to correspond to river valleys.
F.3 Other Covariates

Figure 17 shows the most important product in each feudal village by value, with the legend including data on the total share of each item. To calculate a distance with this data, we use a discrete version of Equation 32. As discussed in Appendix A, this distance corresponds to commonly used measures of fragmentation.

Instead of points located geographically, let $j$ now index types of products, and let $J$ be the set of all products. The distance between feudal villages $i$ and $i'$ in terms of production is then

$$
\ell_{i'i}^{\text{prod}} = \sum_{j \in J} s_{ij}^{\text{prod}} s_{i'j}^{\text{prod}}
$$

(33)

where $s_{ij}^{\text{prod}}$ is the share of the $j$ product in feudal village $i$’s production.

To create $X_{\pi,\text{prod}}$, we use a slight modification of Equation 9:

$$
X_{\pi,\text{prod}} = \sum_{m \in \pi} \frac{1}{\text{Prod}_m} \sum_{i \in m} \sum_{i' \in m} \ell_{i'i}^{\text{prod}} \text{prod}_i \text{prod}_{i'}
$$

(34)

where $\text{prod}_i$ is total production in feudal village $i$, and $\text{Prod}_m$ is total production in coalition $m$.

We use a similar method to calculate distances regarding the types of land present in each feudal village, the identity of the lord of the village during the feudal period, the identity of religious sects in the villages, and the distribution of land among landlords. Figures 18 - 21 provide a summary of these data.

In addition to agriculture, some areas of Gifu engaged in fishing. This was mainly along the banks of rivers, although some ponds and lakes appear to also have been used. Figure 22 shows the distribution of fishermen in Gifu.

The official orders that resulted in the Meiji municipal mergers occurring explicitly mentioned a target size for amalgamated municipalities: they were supposed to be between 300 and 500 households. Let $\text{HH}_m$ be the number of households in municipality $m$. Then

$$
X_{\pi,\text{HH300}} = \sum_{m \in \pi} 1(\text{HH}_m > 300) X_{\pi,\text{HH500}} = \sum_{m \in \pi} 1(\text{HH}_m < 500).
$$

(35)

This definition only makes sense if all the partitions considered contain the same number of municipalities. This variable is thus only used in Column II, Table 4.
Production information on quantities from the GKCR is multiplied by price.

Land value information from GKCR
Figure 19: Most important feudal lord

Figure 20: Religious sects
Landlords in each village are counted by size of landholdings: greater than ¥100, 200, 300, 500, 700, 1000, 1500, 2000, 5000, 10000, and 20000. Violet corresponds to small landlords, and red to large landlords. Villages are sorted by amount of total holdings. Because of data quality issues, no “less than ¥100” category is used.

A final variable of interest is income, $y$, which we treat as equivalent to tax base per capita. In our data, tax base is measured in *koku*: Figure 23 shows the distribution of *koku* per capita in the data. The modal *koku* rating is close to 1 *koku* per capita. This is a plausible value, as the *koku* unit of measure was originally defined as the amount of rice required to feed a man for one year, and production in rural Japan during this period was close to subsistence levels. Gifu, like most of Japan during this period, was predominantly rural and agricultural.

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77 |J|=37 in the GKCR data, but even approximate price data only appears to be available for 21 of these, and thus only 21 products are used. All of these 21 are agricultural, although some of the omitted 16 products are not.

78 It might be possible to rewrite the equations so that they are an average rather than a sum. We do not pursue this, and it is not obvious that it would lead to reasonable results.
The alternative partitions considered consist either of moving a single municipality from one merger to another ($\Pi'_1$), or performing one additional merger or one fewer merger than actually occurred ($\Pi'_2$), or both. The precise construction of $\tilde{X}$ is strongly influenced by a desire to keep all entries of this data matrix at roughly the same order of magnitude, as this substantially reduces computational difficulties.

Consider first $\Pi'_1$, where a single feudal village $i$ is reassigned. Treat the other portion of municipality $m_1$ as a single player, labelled $m'_1$ below. The difference in the heterogeneity cost between $\pi'$ and $\pi^0$ will be

$$r_{m'_1}(L(m'_1, m'_1) - L(m'_1, m'_1 \cup i)) + r_i(L(i, m_2 \cup i) - L(i, m'_1 \cup i)) + r_{m_2}(L(m_2, m_2 \cup i) - L(m_2, m_2))$$

(36)

where $L$ is defined as in Equation 4, except weighted by the relevant variable $r$ rather than $y$. Suppose that the measurement error in the $L(m'_1, m'_1)$ and $L(m_2, m_2)$ terms is zero. Then there are four terms with measurement error, all related to moving player $i$.

Now consider the case of a merger. Here the heterogeneity cost will be

$$r_{m_1}(L(m_1, m_1 \cup m_2) - L(m_1, m_1)) + r_{m_2}(L(m_2, m_1 \cup m_2) - L(m_2, m_2))$$

(37)

Here similarly suppose that the measurement error in the $L(m_1, m_1)$ and $L(m_2, m_2)$ terms is zero. Then there are two terms with measurement error, both related to the $m_1 \cup m_2$ merger.

Suppose that we wish to make each term equally important, regardless of whether $r$ is
particularly high or low in this particular case. Then we should divide by the value of \( r \). This is useful empirically, even though it is not exactly the model laid out in Section 1. It remains to choose what value of \( r \) to divide by: we choose \( 4r_i \) in the case of swaps, and \( \frac{2(r_1+r_2)}{2} \) in the case of mergers.\(^79\)

\section*{H Predicted Partition for Central Planner}

The polygons in Figure 24 show the actually observed partition chosen by the central planner in Gifu. The dots in the figure correspond to the centroids of municipalities the central planner is predicted to create with \( \beta_1 = -0.08 \). A good fit of the model with the observed data is indicated by one centroid per observed merger, as this corresponds to central planner being predicted to create a municipality that corresponds to each one that was actually created. Areas where there are multiple centroids for each observed merger, or fewer centroids than observed mergers, are areas where the model fit is not as good. A problematic area is evident in the north of Figure 24, where the mergers that are predicted are too small.

\(^79\)Algebra based on i.i.d. measurement errors would suggest dividing by \( \sqrt{2} \) instead of 2. The implications of such an approach are undesirable, however: carried out fully, enormous weight would be placed on observations involving large coalitions, because the i.i.d. assumption implies that the aggregate measurement error is smaller for these coalitions, compared to the true changes. A plausible model of error structures that does not display this phenomenon appears challenging to develop, and we thus use an ad hoc approach instead.

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relative to the actually observed mergers. This corresponds to Gujou county. Unfortunately, qualitative sources do not give any indication regarding why the mergers chosen by the central planner in this county appear to differ from the pattern of mergers elsewhere in Gifu.

Figure 25 shows Voronoi cells calculated based on the centroids of the optimal partition. If a new player with very small population were added to the data, the cells indicate which municipality the social planner would assign the new player to. The model predicts substantial variation in the size of municipality between the densely populated plain in the middle of the prefecture, and the more mountainous areas at the edges.

I Local Government in the Meiji Period

Matsuzawa [2013] provides a general qualitative overview of the period in which with the municipal mergers examined in this paper occurred. The Meiji period involved rapid administrative change, and while we focus our attention on the situation in 1890 (Meiji 23), when the mergers in Gifu prefecture were largely finalized, we will also describe the system in the years leading up to this as this is when many initial mergers occurred.

First, we will describe the system of taxation, and the degree to which it can be represented by a model with a single proportional tax rate. Second, we will describe the type of fiscal federalism in place, and the lack of large scale equalization payments. Finally, we will
discuss the decision-making system: this was democratic, but with a restricted franchise, and a multi-tier voting system that gave extra weight to the elite. These three features of the data correspond to important assumptions made in the model in Section 1: proportional taxation, no intergovernmental transfers, and weighting by income.

Almost all municipal spending was devoted to three items: education, public works, and general administration. Education spending consisted mainly of spending on primary schooling, generally using a single school. Public works spending included spending on roads, irrigation, and flood prevention. General administration involved mainly maintaining the population register, collecting taxes, and some shared organizational overhead for the other expenditures. The major source of tax revenue was property tax, which was proportional to land holdings.\footnote{The other major source of tax revenue was a household tax that was related to income, but was not strictly proportional. There appears to be debate in the literature regarding the exact nature of this tax Takayose [2000].The assumption used in this paper is that taxation is overall proportional, and thus that the non-proportionality in the household tax is due to the fact that poorer households derive less of their income from property, and thus are taxed more heavily on the household tax.}

The modern Japanese system for local government, both from an administrative and fiscal perspective, was established by a combination of the 1888 municipal administrative laws, the 1890 county and prefectural administrative laws, and the 1889 imperial constitution.\footnote{These laws were the \textit{shi-sei} and \textit{chouson-sei}, covering cities and towns/villages, respectively, as well as the \textit{gun-sei} for counties and \textit{fukun-sei} for prefectures. A variety of other related laws were also put in place during this period. An authoritative reference here is Oishi [1961].} Fujita
[1955], as well as most other historians of Japanese local government, regard this as period in which there was strong central control over local affairs. With some exceptions, this control tended to be exercised in a way that was technocratic rather than partisan.

In many prefectures, the Meiji daigappei municipal mergers coincided closely with the passage of the 1888 municipal laws, with the aim of completing the mergers at the time the laws came into force. Ido [1966] provides a summary of this merger process. The mergers resulted in an average of 5.15 old municipalities being amalgamated into one new one.82

In Yamanashi, Gifu, Nagasaki, and Nagano prefectures, however, the average number of old municipalities amalgamated into a new one was much lower: 1.39, 1.44, 1.77, and 2.27, respectively. This is because these four prefectures had already undertaken a set of municipal mergers around 1874-76, under the older “ward” ordinance (daiku shouku sei) of 1871. Thus, in these four prefectures, only a smaller number of mergers were necessary around 1888 in order to establish a system of local government consistent with the new laws.83

Because of the lengthier merger process in Gifu, a description of how the mergers in the prefecture were actually implemented requires a discussion of the entire 1871-1888 period. For this discussion, it is useful to follow the subdivisions in Yokoyama [1957], looking first at the period before the local government organization law of 1878 (Gun kuchouson hensei hou), and then the period after it.

I.1 Meiji Local Government, 1871-1878

After the Meiji restoration of 1868, important early objectives of the new regime included the abolition of the feudal system and the establishment of a modern administrative infrastructure. The former objective was accomplished with the mass seizure of feudal domains in 1869 (the hanseki houkan), and the latter began in 1871 with the haihan chiken, which replaced these 300+ feudal administrative divisions with a system of prefectures, governed

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82According to Ido [1966], at the end of 1888 there were 71,314 municipalities, 2482 of which were in special areas covered by a different set of laws, and 68,832 of which were covered by the standard set of laws. At the end of 1889, mergers within the latter group had reduced its number to 13,377. This was reported as a ratio of 5.14.

83In Gifu, in between the 1874-76 mergers and the 1888 mergers, there was a period with 19 splits but no mergers (History of Gifu Prefecture, p. 231). A more detailed model might thus account for the fact that in Gifu, the “Meiji mergers” actually occurred in two distinct stages. However, given that there were splits in between the two sets of mergers, there does not appear to have been any real commitment on the part of the government to the mergers of 1874-76. Thus, in this paper, we ignore the distinction between mergers that happened “early” and those that happened “later”, and compare only the initial pre-merger boundaries with the final ones. The only exception is for the “early” mergers that actually took place before our covariates were collected: for these, our dataset contains only the merged municipalities, and we thus use these in our analysis. In one case, one of these “pre-merged” municipalities in our dataset was split, with portions going to two new amalgamated municipalities. For this case, we place the entire municipality with the amalgamation that received the majority of its surface area.
by prefects. Although central control was prioritized, these prefectures were given a certain degree of decision-making authority in order to be able to quickly respond to local conditions. Within each prefecture, the prefect and other important positions were centrally appointed, but there were also provisions for consultative bodies, including elected ones.

The modern resident registration system was established as these reforms were ongoing. Under the 1871 koseki law, the residence of each individual was tracked by administrators at the local level. The regions covered by these administrators formed the wards and sub-wards of the “ward” ordinance of 1871. Each ward was to have a head, and each of its constituent sub-wards a vice-head (fuku-kuchou). It is unclear whether these new wards were to replace the pre-existing local structure from the feudal period, or supplement it. Suzue [1992] provides a survey arguing for the latter, even though official source documents state that traditional local positions (shouya, nanushi, toshiyori) were to be abolished and replaced by the ward head and vice-head (Grand Council of State notice 117, 1872), and that the ward system established for resident registration, with its heads and vice-heads, formed the fundamental local administrative system (Grand Council of State notice 146, 1872). Regardless of the details, the system was revised almost as soon as it was in place: at an 1875 meeting (the dai-ikkai chihoukan kaigi) it was decided that both wards and sub-wards were to have leaders and vice-leaders.

The wards of the ward system do not appear to have been carefully designed to reflect local cultural and geographic connections. One possibility is that the apparent lack of care given to drawing these boundaries is due to the speed with which the system was implemented. Alternatively, it may be an indicator that, notwithstanding official declarations to the contrary, the ward system was never intended to function as the main system of local governance.

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84 These prefectoral boundaries were not as new as might appear: they were initially constructed by merging together historical provinces (kuni), whose boundaries had been generally unchanged for the past 600 years.

85 The lowest level appointed officials, responsible for the koseki system discussed below, were drawn on to form one type of consultative body (the kukochou kai). A separate body could be constituted via elections, generally with franchise restricted to wealthy landowners (the min kai). According to one contemporary report, in 1875 there were 23 prefectures with the former type of body, 7 with the latter, and 19 without either (http://www.gichokai.gr.jp/hensen/01.html). These bodies continued in roughly the same form after the “three new laws” of 1878, discussed in the next section. These laws established formal limits on the remit of the assemblies: they were to deal only with matters of local taxation and expenditure, and could be dissolved by the central government. The central government was particularly concerned that decentralization could lead to factionalism and instability, and closely monitored the activities of the assemblies [Oshima, 1994, p. 34].

86 Each sub-ward was supposed to consist of 4-5 towns or 7-8 villages.

87 These were to be kuchou/fuku-kuchou and kochou/fuku-kochou, respectively.

88 Oishi [1961] and Oshima [1994] discuss how the ward boundaries did not reflect the natural boundaries of daily life at the village level. On the other hand, Tajima [1983] and Okumura [1984] provide
The authoritative description of municipal mergers during this period in Gifu is given in the *History of Gifu Prefecture*.⁸⁹ According to the 1872 Grand Council of State ordinances and some 1873 Interior Ministry directives, individual villages that had low population or limited land area were to be merged in order to prevent inefficient expenditure of public funds.⁹⁰ In discussion with the Ministry around May 1873, Prefect Yoshitsura Hasebe planned on implementing this policy in Gifu by merging those villages that did not have any inhabitants, and those that had originally been split due to manorial succession (*jitou koutai*). The Ministry, however, requested instead that a detailed survey be performed, and all villages with less than 50 koku (of assessed tax base) be merged because the burden of municipal expenditures there was too great. A survey of ward heads and vice-heads, including questions about potential mergers, was performed, and a set of mergers were carried out by 1875.⁹¹ At the national level, however, a policy reversal had taken place, and from 1875 onwards, it was decreed that no further municipal mergers were to take place without a special reason.⁹²

Turning to the public finance system, 1873 saw a reform of taxing authority under the *chiso* land tax system, which at that time accounted for a majority of national revenues. This reform changed the old in-kind tax system to a standard modern property tax: tax was to be paid in currency, at certain tax rate, on a certain assessed tax base. The tax rate was set at 3%. Tax base was initially assessed using agricultural production data, with the objective that total tax owed under the new system should be roughly equal to that under the old system. In addition, the tax system was extended to urban areas: Takayose [2002] provides a detailed description of the new *chiso*, including its application to households in towns and cities.⁹³ Increased tax revenue was to be used for industrialization and militarization, major objectives of the Meiji regime.

Public finance at the local level was regarded as clearly secondary in importance to examples of prefectures where ward boundaries did reflect traditional local divisions. According to the *gokumi hensei hou* (Grand Council of State notice 117, 1872), historical *go* (units of five households) were to be used for communication with the local populace, pointing to the inadequacy of the ward system on its own. Kato [1979] provides an example of this in Bungo (now part of Oita prefecture), as does the *Noumin seikatsu hensen* for Takizawa in Morioka prefecture (ch. 6 sec. 3.3). See also <http://www.town.minobu.lg.jp/chosei/choushi/shimobe/shimobechoushi08.pdf> (p. 659-660).

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⁸⁹around p. 222.
⁹⁰The target villages were *chiseki kyouai* or *doguchi kishou*.
⁹¹around p. 225.
⁹²around p. 160-1. Source documents do not explain the reasons for this abrupt change. Wild speculation might suggest the following: a realization that the ward system should be replaced completely by the 1888 municipal system might lead to the conclusion that the time currently being spent on changing boundaries so as to better implement the ward system should instead be devoted to other issues.
⁹³The primary source here is Finance Ministry notice 98, June 1873.
Table 10: Local *minpi* expenditures in Ward 1, Sub-ward 4
(Kouyama and 30 other villages in Suntou county, Shizuoka prefecture)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Official vice-leader (<em>fuku-kochou</em>) salary</td>
<td>¥1014.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>100.600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appearances at ward office</td>
<td>53.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writing brushes</td>
<td>22.695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ink</td>
<td>9.420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stationery (local paper)</td>
<td>23.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“ (quality <em>Saduka-gami</em>)”</td>
<td>37.145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“ (quality <em>Mino-gami</em>)”</td>
<td>1.800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td>495.560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road and bridge repair</td>
<td>204.720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candles</td>
<td>10.280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>12.915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamp oil</td>
<td>2.700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shrine festival</td>
<td>86.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messenger wages</td>
<td>278.850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weirs etc. (agricultural)</td>
<td>37.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flood prevention</td>
<td>63.300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wild board abatement</td>
<td>6.500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>¥2459.706</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: total should be ¥2459.715.
Table 11: Revenue and expenditure, national and local governments, 1873-78 (¥1000s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1873</th>
<th>1874</th>
<th>1875</th>
<th>1876</th>
<th>1877</th>
<th>1878</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National tax</td>
<td>65,014</td>
<td>103,567</td>
<td>97,458</td>
<td>51,730</td>
<td>47,923</td>
<td>51,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefectural tax</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>1,052</td>
<td>1,281</td>
<td>1,802</td>
<td>3,588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal tax (minpi)</td>
<td>16,238</td>
<td>17,467</td>
<td>21,339</td>
<td>23,436</td>
<td>17,785</td>
<td>14,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage national</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(National) government expenditures 62,679 115,332 92,265 59,308 48,429 60,941
Official salaries 8,717 12,758 11,839 8,059 9,211 9,439
Local expenditures (minpi) 13,315 17,467 19,412 22,409 17,785 18,479
Prefectural tax expenditures 434 822 922 1,129 1,681 4,048
(National) government percentage 74% 79% 74% 65% 63% 66%


the collection of revenue for the national government. Here, the traditional minpi/kyougihi ("people’s expenditure" / "cooperative expenditure") system was maintained: this consisted mainly of informal collections to pay for local public goods, organized and collected at the local level, with enforcement carried out through social ties rather than the legal system. Table 10 provides a breakdown of expenditures for a representative agricultural sub-ward.\footnote{This sub-ward was located in a fairly mountainous region, as evidenced by the wild boar line item.}
Personnel expenditures (for the vice-leader and messenger) totalled ¥1290, school expenditures ¥495, and public works (roads & bridges, weirs, and flood prevention) about ¥305. These line items made up 85% of total expenditures.

At the prefectural level, miscellaneous small taxes were used in addition to minpi, but informal levies remained the backbone of the system.\footnote{Officially, the official prefectural revenue sources were classified as levies (fukin) until 1874, and taxes (fukenzei) from 1875 onwards.} From 1872, the prefectural tax base included prostitutes, geisha, and other related female employment [Tomaru, 2000]. From 1873 prefectures were allowed to levy a surtax on the central government tax base, but the rates that were allowed appear to be quite low.\footnote{For details, see Table 10 of Takayose [2002]: for Saitama Prefecture in 1877, minhi was equivalent to 55% of national taxes, but prefectural (official) taxes only 2%.} Table 11 shows revenue and expenditure for national and local governments during this period: although official tax revenue for prefectural governments increased dramatically in percentage terms, overall the revenue system at the local level remained predominantly informal. The difference between the national percentage in revenue and in expenditure reflects the fact that some local expenditures were paid from national funds: we will argue that this is not relevant for the
Table 12: Assistance to Prefectures (¥1000s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1876</th>
<th>1877</th>
<th>1878</th>
<th>1879</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salaries</td>
<td>2,453</td>
<td>2,703</td>
<td>2,823</td>
<td>2,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisons</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>1,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total general assistance</td>
<td>3,709</td>
<td>3,976</td>
<td>4,113</td>
<td>4,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public works</td>
<td>1,420</td>
<td>1,384</td>
<td>1,482</td>
<td>1,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal schools</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary schools</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(National) police</td>
<td>1,247</td>
<td>1,388</td>
<td>1,398</td>
<td>1,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefectural police</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>1,629</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>1,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total specific assistance</td>
<td>4,341</td>
<td>5,236</td>
<td>5,298</td>
<td>5,056</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Meiji zenki zaisei keizai shiryou shusei vol. IV. This table is reproduced in Takayose [2000] as Table 35, but with the units reported as ¥ rather than ¥1000s.
Note: some totals appear to be calculated incorrectly. “Other” line item is authors’ calculations.

Many aspects of the fiscal relationship between prefectures and municipalities are unclear for the early Meiji period, and sources often consider both levels of local government together. However, according to Fujita [1939], the chiso tax system ignored municipalities. The main assistance to local governments was through the traditional joubakin (“reserved funds”) system, which was at the prefectural level. A fraction of taxes collected in each prefecture (originally each han) was retained in that prefecture for local expenses, rather than being transferred to the central government. The assistance provided through this system was divided into “general” assistance (fukenhi hojo) and “specified” assistance (hojokin), and a breakdown of these payments is given in Table 12. The “general” assistance paid mainly for salaries and the operation of prisons. The salaries in question were likely for personnel performing duties required by the national government, and the prisons were

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97 Later on, the upper limit on this reservation system would be more strictly controlled by the central government rather than by tradition, with the limit being reduced over time.
Table 13: Prefectural police expenditures by source of funds, all prefectures (¥1000s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1876</th>
<th>1877</th>
<th>1878</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Official funds</td>
<td>1,961</td>
<td>2,994</td>
<td>3,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal tax funds</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>1,369</td>
<td>1,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage official funds</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nakajima [1915], reproduced in Takayose [2000] as Table 39.

Table 14: Prefectural police expenditures by source of funds, Gifu Prefecture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1875</th>
<th>1876</th>
<th>1877</th>
<th>1878</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Official funds</td>
<td>¥6,540.381</td>
<td>¥13,015.312</td>
<td>¥14,279.950</td>
<td>¥14,161.683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal tax funds</td>
<td>16,289.954</td>
<td>21,633.889</td>
<td>32,136.798</td>
<td>31,357.690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage official funds</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: History of Gifu Prefecture, Table 89.

holding criminals convicted of violating national laws. This portion of the assistance thus corresponds roughly to a set of responsibilities delegated from the national government to the prefectures. The “specified” assistance was intended to defray expenses for specific local services. These payments, however, were not made with the objective of equalizing revenues or otherwise redistributing resources, but were instead based on a formula that considered population and the amount of agricultural production.98 The intent thus appears to be that the assistance payments should cover a fraction of the cost of providing certain services. We will examine each of the major services in turn.

First, Table 13 shows the source of funds for prefectural police expenditures. Takayose [2000] equates “official funds” (kanpi) with funds from national tax revenue, and concludes that the national government is paying for over 60% of local prefectural police expenditures, with the prefectural government responsible only for about 1/3.99 He explains that this division was formalized at an 1875 meeting, with the distribution of “official funds” to be based on prefectural population. Data shows that, across prefectures, there were substantial differences in the percentage of local funds in police expenditures. This data is shown for

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98Exceptions to this formula were made for prefectures with international ports or large rivers. See, for example, Takayose [2000], p.164. The original source documents are available in the Fukun-sei shiryou.  
99Reality may have been slightly more complicated, as official prefectural tax revenue was likely included in “official funds”. However, according to [Oshima, 1994, p. 117], this prefectural tax revenue did not exceed 1/20 of the informal minpi revenues, and thus Takayose’s conclusions stand because the percentages he reports would not change materially with a more detailed analysis.
Table 15: Elementary school funding (¥1000s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1875</th>
<th>1876</th>
<th>1877</th>
<th>1878</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rollover/Savings/Interest</td>
<td>1,446</td>
<td>1,838</td>
<td>2,021</td>
<td>2,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal tax</td>
<td>3,286</td>
<td>3,424</td>
<td>2,697</td>
<td>3,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuition</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local tax</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official funds</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage official funds</td>
<td>9.8%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chiba [1962]. This is reproduced in Takayose [2000] as Table 95, but with incorrectly calculated percentages.

Gifu Prefecture in Table 14: official funds cover only 1/3 of expenditures, rather than the national average of 2/3. Source documents suggest that these differences have their origin in the formulae used, which appear to have prioritized police in major urban centers and important ports.\(^{100}\) Thus, the payments to “ordinary” prefectures lacking these special features are lower than aggregate data would suggest.

Continuing, Table 15 shows expenditures on education. Here “official funds” are much less important than for the police, covering less than 10% of total expenditures.\(^{101}\) According to the 1872 *gakusei* education policy, local governments were responsible for providing education, notwithstanding their almost complete lack of formal tax revenue. Tsutsui [2005] provides a detailed discussion of the situation in this period in part of Saitama Prefecture.

Table 16 shows revenue and expenditure for the Taiseisha school of Ward 1, Sub-ward 4.\(^{102}\)

\(^{100}\) An early source document here is Grand Council of State ordinance 16, 1883: this appears to set a national assistance rate of 60% for Tokyo, and 30% for other prefectures. This may be related to distinction in nomenclature between the police in Tokyo (*keishichou,* headed by the *keishi soukan*) and in other prefectures (*fuken keisatsu*) that continues to the present day. Takayose [2000] (p. 83) compares the funding calculations actually used, and compares them to a simpler formula based on population and surface area. He concludes that there were additional subsidies to Tokyo (450%), Kyoto (350%), Osaka (350%), Kanagawa (70%), and Hyogo (70%).

\(^{101}\) There was a further drop in this even low level of support in 1882, with the abolition of assistance payments from the national treasury. Strong national support for schools did not begin until 1918, with the introduction of mandatory schooling.

\(^{102}\) This school was the 25th school district, serving the villages of Kamado, Hagikabu, and Numata. It was built in 1874, and destroyed in a fire in 1877. During this period schools were sometimes operated by groups of villages, although mergers due to the costs of operating a school were also common. A merger was in fact proposed in this case, and would have involved four additional nearby villages, but it did not take

81
Table 16: Revenue and expenses, Taiseisha school

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1875</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>¥100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal tax</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuition</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total revenue</strong></td>
<td>¥214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher salaries</td>
<td>¥57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous salaries</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Books and equipment</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance etc.</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total expenses</strong></td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: History of Gotemba City vol 5, p. 304, following Tsutsui [2005].

Table 17: Prefectural public works, source of funds (¥1000s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1876</th>
<th>1877</th>
<th>1878</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>1,403</td>
<td>1,333</td>
<td>1,462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local</td>
<td>2,595</td>
<td>3,221</td>
<td>3,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage national</strong></td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Imperial Japan Statistical Yearbook, reproduced in Takayose [2000] as Table 40.

The interest revenue shown is from an endowment of ¥1000, collected through “donations” that appear to have had substantial non-voluntary characteristics. The History of Gotemba City (p. 314) reports on the case of Hagiwara Village, where an effectively mandatory collection was made, with the amount varying between ¥100 and ¥1, depending on the “donor”. The vast majority of expenditures on education were thus local in nature, and, although the details are unclear, appear to have been paid for via a proportional tax of some sort.

The third major type of prefectural expenditure was public works. The 1873 Regulations on River, Port, and Road Repair and Construction (kakoudouro shuchiku kisoku) established a standard division between official funds and minpi for these projects.\textsuperscript{103} Table 17 shows place. Although many mergers did in fact take place during the 1870s, according to Tomaru [2000] (p. 130) these mostly involved villages with extremely small populations, and there was no general tendency toward merging in average-sized villages.

\textsuperscript{103} A rough summary would be that the fraction of funding from official funds depended on the size of the
Table 18: Administrative expenditures in Gifu prefecture, source of funds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1880</th>
<th>1881</th>
<th>1882</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National funds</td>
<td>¥55,545</td>
<td>¥56,484</td>
<td>¥63,577</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local funds</td>
<td>145,232</td>
<td>155,023</td>
<td>159,582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal funds</td>
<td>95,748</td>
<td>91,078</td>
<td>117,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage national</td>
<td>18.73%</td>
<td>18.67%</td>
<td>18.65%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Imperial Japan Statistical Yearbook.*

Notes: “Local funds” are defined as prefectural assembly funds, county and ward bureaucrat salaries and travel expenses, within-area messenger and billboard expenses, ward head salaries, and expenses associated with the ward head. “Municipal funds” are defined as town hall expenses and assembly expenses.

the source of funds for prefectural public works across Japan, with only about 30% being paid for by the national government.\(^{104}\)

Finally, there were administrative expenditures. Table 18 shows the breakdown in source of funds for these expenditures for Gifu Prefecture. Unfortunately, there is no data available from 1879 or earlier, so the table gives the three earliest years available. National funds account for about 18% of expenditures.

As shown by the comparison between police and education above, national funds are allocated more heavily to prefectural expenses than municipal ones. Thus, national funding of administrative expenses for municipalities was likely substantially less than 18%. Overall, it appears to be a reasonable assumption that municipalities were responsible for raising their own funds to provide public services.

I.2 Meiji Local Government, 1878-1888

In 1878 the “three new laws” were promulgated, regarding prefectural administration, county and municipal organization, and local taxes, respectively. This was a major change from the previous system of local government. This subsection describes the state of local public project in question. 1st class and 2nd class projects received some official funds, but 3rd class and below received none. The system was changed in 1875, such that regular maintenance would be paid for from minpi, but official funds would be provided in the case of major damage. National funding continued as a transitional measure until 1880, but was stopped thereafter.

\(^{104}\)Kobayashi [1997], for example, emphasizes the importance of the prefecture in providing public works in the case of rivers.
administration during the period after these laws, up until the time of the 1888 local government act and the finalization of the Meiji municipal mergers.

At the municipal level, the ward system previously in place was generally regarded as unsuccessful, the most common complaint being that ward and sub-ward boundaries failed to accurately reflect either traditional cultural boundaries or the patterns of contemporary daily life. Wards were abolished, and a system of cities, towns and villages was restored. Towns and villages were grouped into counties, which nominally also provided public services with their own bureaucratic apparatus. In practice, however, expenditures at the county level were minimal, the positions that did exist may have been sinecures, and no public services appear to have actually been delivered. Counties usually only appear in period documents when used for communication, organization, or statistical purposes, and it appears that they can safely be disregarded for the purposes of this paper.

Under the new system, administrative boundaries were revised to reflect traditional divisions. The position of head (kochou) became a quasi-elected office, and in the view of Oshima [1994] the position was now likely to be occupied by the most powerful members of the village.

The new municipal system was implemented beginning in 1880, and, while it was a substantial improvement on some dimensions, it also resulted in new problems. In Gifu, 24% of villages had 50 households or fewer, and another 36% had between 50 and 100. Establishing a modern administrative infrastructure using units of this size appeared to be a challenging undertaking at best.

For local public finance, a new local tax system was defined, including in particular a newly created formal tax base at the prefectural level. No substantial change was made at the municipal level, though, with the traditional minpi system left in place [Fujita, 1939].

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105 For example, see the discussion in Ido [1969].
106 The Interior Ministry itself reports the situation with a slightly different emphasis, stating that the head is an official located below the prefect and (county) head in the administrative hierarchy, and needs to be closely monitored to ensure that they carry out their duties faithfully (notice 80, 1878).
107 There were even some villages with fewer than 10 households. Details are provided in the History of Gifu Prefecture, Table 81.
108 For example, in 1879 the prefectural assembly decided that all villages should have a village assembly, with 10 members in the case of villages of less than 200 households (History of Gifu Prefecture, p. 402). This was later revised downwards to 6 members, for villages of 300 households or less. Considering the costs of communication and travel given in Table 10, it seems that small villages faced a high per capita financial burden. A separate issue is whether there would even be 6 motivated householders present in a smaller village.
109 A rough translation of the government transcript in Ogasawara [1878] would read “with respect to municipal expenditures, these are the responsibility of the residents of each municipality, are not categorized as local taxes, and the collection methods are thus not stated in the regulations regarding local taxation” (quoted in Oshima [1968]). As reported in Oshima [1994], Article 3 of the Local Tax Regulations states
Municipalities used a variety of methods to collect necessary funds, but, as shown in Table 19, the most important sources were the levy on property, and the levy on households. This property levy was strictly proportional, in the sense that it was collected as a percentage of the assessed tax base for the national chika land tax. To avoid overtaxation, the ability of municipalities to collect levies on the chiso land tax base was restricted after 1885, resulting in a rise in the relative importance of household levies. The relative importance of tax bases varied substantially across prefectures. The property levy appears to have been particularly important for municipalities in Gifu, making up half of collections even in later years. As the property levy was proportional, the proportional tax rate model used in this paper is thus particularly appropriate in the case of Gifu.

The most important source of funds other than the property levy was the household levy. This is sometimes viewed as a sort of (informal) poll tax; however, the literature dealing with this levy shows that this is clearly not the case, and a degree of proportionality was also used that necessary funds for each municipality are left as a matter for the municipal residents to resolve “cooperatively”, and further implementation directives clarified that municipalities were free to use all traditional means to collect revenues, including levies on households and property. There was no further government interference until 1884, when in a further reform kyoughi (“cooperative funds”) were relabeled as chousonki (“municipal funds”).

Takayose [2002] examines six prefectures in the Tohoku region, and compares the revenue raised by other levies to that raised by land levies. In all prefectures land levies are the most important, with revenue from other levies equaling 96% (Fukushima), 78% (Miyagi), 75% (Iwate), 74% (Aomori), 44% (Yamagata), and 41% (Akita) of the revenue raised from land levies.
Table 20: Prefectural household levies, Urawa office, Saitama Prefecture (1881)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Total Levy (¥)</th>
<th>Households</th>
<th>Levy per Household (¥)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>14.00</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>16.80</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>57.00</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>47.00</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>22.80</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>122.40</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>12.30</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>28.00</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th</td>
<td>30.30</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 21: Municipal household rates, Hyogo Prefecture (1880)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Total Levy (¥)</th>
<th>Households</th>
<th>Levy per Household (¥)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>3.85</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>5.40</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unclassified</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>excluded</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 22: Prefectural household levies, Tsuyama Town, Okayama Prefecture (1908)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Households</th>
<th>Levy per Household (¥)</th>
<th>CDF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st class</td>
<td>1 ¥67,000</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>3 59,000</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>1 52,000</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>2 44,000</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>6 37,000</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10th</td>
<td>23 19,496</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15th</td>
<td>98 5,305</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-20th</td>
<td>372 1,851</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21-25th</td>
<td>531 833</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-30th</td>
<td>1072 268</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-33rd</td>
<td>1371 78</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>exempt</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sakamoto [1975], Table 13.

in assessing this levy.\textsuperscript{111} Tables 20 and 21 show examples of the amounts collected via the household levy at the prefectural level and municipal level, respectively. In both cases, the amount collected from a household varies according to the classification of the household, which appears to have depended on the resources that each household had available.

According to Kashiwagi [1999], these classifications were done in an \textit{ad hoc} manner, by the head and other powerful members of the village, and thus may have been devised to benefit the privileged. Circumstantial evidence for this can be seen by examining a later tax table of the same form, shown in Table 22. The amounts in this table, from 1908, are such that the richest tax payer is paying approximately 860 times as much tax as the poorest. In contrast, Tables 20 and 21 show the richest tax payer paying about 10 times as much tax as the poorest. Although there may have been an increase in inequality between 1880 and 1908, and the table from 1908 deals with a much larger population, it seems likely that the earlier tables are not equivalent to a strictly proportional tax on a certain tax base, but have rather been set such that wealthier households pay less tax in percentage terms. This is also

\textsuperscript{111} There is some debate regarding whether the tax took into account extenuating circumstances of individual taxpayers or not, with Takayose [2002] quoting Shukutoshi [1895] in support of the former position, and Minobe [1895] the latter. According to Mizumoto [1991], the calculation of levies was left at the discretion of each municipality, and seem to have been often decided as a \textit{prix a la tete} (mitatewari). Further complicating the situation, there were some cases in which a poll tax \textit{was} used: according to Takayose [2002], Saitama and Kanagawa Prefectures had such a system near the end of the 1870s.
likely given the electoral rules in place for municipalities. The franchise was restricted to taxpayers, with wealthier ones receiving greater representation, as will be discussed later.

Intergovernmental transfers continued to be of minimal importance at the municipal level. Figure 26 shows the source of funds for expenditures at the national and local level in 1880. “General assistance” here corresponds to the salaries of certain personnel, the cost of collecting taxes, and certain other functions delegated from the national government to local governments. “Specified assistance” mainly consists of payments related to the construction of public works, such as the maintenance of major roads or recovery efforts after disasters [Oshima, 1968, p. 88-89]. Both the general and specified assistance payments were related to the amount of work performed by the local government, rather than the availability of local taxes to fund this work. In particular, there was no intent to have the assistance payments act as equalization payments.\textsuperscript{112}

As in the 1870s, there continued to be only a very thin relationship between the national government and the municipalities. The transfers that did exist were mainly made by the prefectures. Table 23 shows the distribution of spending by municipalities in this period. Education and public works continue to be the most important line items. In both of these cases, the data shows that contributions from higher levels of government were relatively

\textsuperscript{112}Takayose [2002] states that “despite the increasingly clear differences in economic strength between regions in the 1880s, there was almost no equalization of government fiscal resources.” He further notes that there is actually a positive correlation between per capita local tax revenue and per capita assistance payments during this period.
Table 23: Municipal expenditure by type (¥1000s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Public works</th>
<th>Hygiene</th>
<th>Industrial promotion</th>
<th>Town hall / administration</th>
<th>Assembly</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Emergency assistance / misc.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>6,382</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>2,690</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>6,568</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>18,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>5,473</td>
<td>699</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>2,718</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>7,142</td>
<td>1,326</td>
<td>17,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>4,039</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>2,672</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>7,729</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>16,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>3,672</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>2,304</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>6,095</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>13,559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>3,135</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>2,526</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>6,153</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>13,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>3,336</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>2,916</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>4,475</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>12,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>3,282</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>3,092</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>4,492</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>12,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from municipal expenditure data in Japan Statistical Yearbook.

Table 24: Public education, source of funds (¥1000s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Rollover/interest</th>
<th>Donations/misc. taxes</th>
<th>Informal levies (kyougihi)</th>
<th>Tuition</th>
<th>Local tax</th>
<th>Ministry of Education</th>
<th>Percentage informal levies</th>
<th>Percentage local tax</th>
<th>Percentage user fees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>2,274</td>
<td>1,075</td>
<td>3,356</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>42.1%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>2,480</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>3,581</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>41.1%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>2,376</td>
<td>1,187</td>
<td>4,453</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>1,069</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>2,395</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>6,037</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>1,309</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>2,061</td>
<td>941</td>
<td>6,988</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>1,504</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>58.2%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>1,855</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>6,850</td>
<td>523</td>
<td>1,534</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>1,477</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>6,961</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>1,536</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>1,406</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>5,501</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>1,401</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>58.4%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>4,146</td>
<td>1,465</td>
<td>1,274</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>1,401</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>3,971</td>
<td>1,994</td>
<td>1,197</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from public education revenue data in the Japan Statistical Yearbook.

Table 24 shows the source of funds for local public education. “Local tax” (i.e. prefec-
tural tax) accounts for about 15% of expenditures, whereas informal taxes at the municipal level account for 50%. In addition, as in Tables 15 and 16, endowment interest is an important source of funding, and this generally has an original source within the municipality. While there was a small amount of direct national government funding until 1881, from a quantitative standpoint education was predominantly funded at the municipal level.\(^{113}\)

The situation with public works was not as extreme as that with education, but the

\(^{113}\) The sharp increase in tuition near the end of the table is due to a change in government policy.
Table 25: Public works, source of funds (¥1000s)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1879</th>
<th>1880</th>
<th>1881</th>
<th>1882</th>
<th>1883</th>
<th>1884</th>
<th>1885</th>
<th>1886</th>
<th>1887</th>
<th>1888</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National assistance</td>
<td>1,471</td>
<td>2,278</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>739</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td>1,246</td>
<td>2,156</td>
<td>1,808</td>
<td>1,983</td>
<td>1,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local expenditures</td>
<td>4,640</td>
<td>5,231</td>
<td>7,691</td>
<td>8,717</td>
<td>8,215</td>
<td>7,827</td>
<td>8,026</td>
<td>8,399</td>
<td>7,802</td>
<td>8,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage national</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Directly controlled)

<p>| | | | | | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National treasury</td>
<td>208.2</td>
<td>133.4</td>
<td>119.6</td>
<td>248.2</td>
<td>331.0</td>
<td>460.9</td>
<td>514.2</td>
<td>307.2</td>
<td>810.2</td>
<td>741.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local tax</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage national</td>
<td>98.3%</td>
<td>98.1%</td>
<td>94.5%</td>
<td>97.1%</td>
<td>97.2%</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
<td>99.4%</td>
<td>99.7%</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from Takayose [2002] Table 58.

The predominance of local revenue sources is still clear. Local tax regulations during this period eliminated national treasury payments for work funded by local taxes, thus making a clear distinction between projects undertaken by a local government, and those controlled directly by the national government. Officially, local governments also had some financial responsibility for national government controlled projects in their jurisdiction, but Table 25 shows that these payments were in fact minimal. Effectively, the national government built certain public works by itself, and the remainder became the responsibility of local governments. The data in Table 25 reports an average of about 20% of funds for projects coming from the national government, but this figure includes projects directly controlled by the national government. The fraction of national funding for local government controlled projects is thus even less than this. Although detailed figures do not appear to be available, prefectural funding for municipal projects appears to have roughly the same structure as national funding for local projects. In both cases, projects were funded by the higher-level government based on the characteristics of the project in question, rather than the ability of the lower-level government to pay for it. There was thus neither a de facto nor de jure equalization system in place in Meiji Japan.

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114 National government controlled projects were generally major roads, bridges, and other large-scale basic infrastructure. The national government also directly controlled maintenance once projects were completed.

115 Matsuzawa [2009] (ch. 6) reports on the situation in Saitama Prefecture as an example. In 1880, public works regulations passed by the prefectural assembly restricted prefectural funds to only the construction of bridges for national roads. However, in 1883, according to Directive 99, funding could be used for the construction and maintenance of other bridges and roads as long as there were a public benefit. Municipalities could apply through their county office, which would investigate and forward the results to the prefectural government, which would evaluate the applications.
I.3 Meiji Municipal Mergers

The literature on municipal mergers in Meiji Japan is voluminous but consists almost exclusively of case studies. We review this literature, with particular attention to the apparent incentives for these mergers.

Ido [1961] examines municipal mergers in Shiga Prefecture in 1873-4, and divides the reasons for the mergers into three groups:

A To improve existing administrative boundaries that were unclear. (90 cases)

B Agricultural land and population were too limited to expect the municipality to be able to manage itself independently. (70 cases)

C Unclear. (86 cases)

Even in the (A) cases, there appears to have been underlying fiscal reasons for the mergers as well, relating to the reform of the chiso land tax system and expenses incurred performing certain functions delegated by the national government. According to Tanabe [1963], in addition to the chiso reforms, the end of the 1880s saw an increase in expenditure requirements for public schooling.\(^\text{116}\)

Oguri [1953] examines correspondence between municipalities and the prefect of Saitama regarding undesired municipal mergers, and groups local opinions into the following categories:\(^\text{117}\)

C Unclear. (6 cases)

D Inability to agree on a name for the amalgamated municipality. (31 items)

E The municipal merger group is inappropriate from the perspective of water (for irrigation). (30 items)

F There is opposition to the merger due to the “condition of the people”. (76 items)

All these reasons can broadly be categorized as “heterogeneity related”, with the water issues directly related to geological or geographic differences, and the inability to agree on a name due to historical differences. The last item is likely a euphemistic description of issues

\(^{116}\) The example given is that of Niita Village, in Tochigi Prefecture.

\(^{117}\) For the purpose of counting items, any item of correspondence that refers to water issues appears to be categorized as such, even if it also mentions other issues. Thus, the relative importance of water may be overstated.
regarding social class, possibly including cases where some lower caste (*burakumin*) residents were to be added to an amalgamated municipality.\textsuperscript{118}

Nakamura [1953] investigates the official 1889 merger report in Fukuoka Prefecture, and finds geographic considerations predominate:

G In mountainous areas, mountain ridges and rivers were generally used as boundaries.

H Rather than merging both banks of a river watershed, mergers concentrated on cases where (irrigation) ponds and weirs were being used cooperatively by upstream and downstream villages.

I Discrimination and differences in occupation led to difficulties in carrying out mergers.\textsuperscript{119}

Of these reasons, the first and last points can easily be thought of as heterogeneity, although the second point suggests that there may also have been some benefit from the internalization of externalities regarding irrigation facilities.\textsuperscript{120}

Tanabe [1963] offers the following reasons for concerns about mergers:

J Different feudal lords, different tax rates, different traditions.

K Conflict over village financial resources.\textsuperscript{121}

L Discriminated-against *buraku*.

Regarding the last point, Ido [1961] considers cases in Shiga Prefecture, and finds that in most cases where a merged municipality subsequently split, *buraku* split off (or perhaps, were split off) from other areas. In more recent research, Ioka [2000] examines the case of a separatist movement in Taishou Village in Nara Prefecture (now Gose City), and shows that this was related to discriminated-against *buraku*. Ioka (in his Table 2) compares different parts of the village (at the *oaza* level), and finds that the household levy for discriminated-against areas is remarkably low. This difference may have been due to basic differences in

\textsuperscript{118}Oguri [1953] also offers as a specific example a case that suggests a slightly different model. In Chichibu County, Saitama, it was difficult to agree on an allocation of public funds between a flat area involved in paddy rice production, and a more mountainous region involved in coal, silk, forestry, and manufacturing. A municipal merger would thus be inappropriate, according to period documents. This case suggests a more complicated model, as it involves differences in spending over public goods, and likely types of public goods, whereas the model used in this paper involves only a single public good provided at a fixed quantity.

\textsuperscript{119}Nakamura offers an example where an area consisting of the descendents of samurai was unwilling to merge with another area.

\textsuperscript{120}See Appendix C for further discussion of externalities.

\textsuperscript{121}This refers to *iriai*, cooperatives that controlled communal resources such as forest. An example was given of Uenohara forest, control of which was split across 13 different villages, and in 1876 served as an impediment to municipal mergers.
income and occupation, but calls for “equality” in paying for public services appears to be one of the causes of municipal partition.

Yamada [1966] looks at the example of Yoshino (yoshino-gou) in Nara Prefecture, and finds that

M (Forestry) resource royalties made mergers difficult.\footnote{This royalty system was established in 1871, and officially named \textit{kaisankin} in 1876. There is also some evidence for benefits from the internalization of externalities, particularly with respect to common natural resources and irrigation infrastructure. Taking account of this, however, would require a substantially more complicated model. We thus ignore this benefit from mergers in this paper. See also Appendix C.}

According to Yamada’s Table 4, in 1891 these royalty revenues made up 65% of all revenues in Kawakami Village. As any merger would have led to sharing this revenue stream, and thus a reduction in per capita revenues, mergers tended not to be popular with villages receiving this sort of revenue.\footnote{Although this is a separate revenue stream from property taxes, and thus is not captured exactly by the model used in this paper, it fairly clearly corresponds to the case where there is a richer municipality that is unwilling to merge with a poorer one.}

Finally, Morishima [1973] looks at Hiyoshi Village in Kyoto Prefecture, finding that

N Communal forest and pasture acts as a financial resource, and appears to encourage the areas that possess it to engage in separatist activity

Overall, the literature regarding the Meiji municipal mergers appears to provide evidence for the following costs and benefits of mergers:

1. Efficiencies of scale, including those in land taxation, education, roads and bridge repair, irrigation, flood prevention, and communication with higher levels of government. Merging with closely connected municipalities allowed for economies of scale in these areas to be exploited.

2. Difficulties when merger partners differ in production activities (e.g. paddy rice vs. dry rice vs. forestry), possibly due to difficulties setting rules for taxation. Similarly, differences in geography, occupation, or income.\footnote{Here it is difficult to determine what is the ultimate cause, as differences in geography might tend to lead to differences in occupation.} Also, differences in class (former samurai, \textit{burakumin}) and differences in formal feudal lord. Access to particular additional revenue from, for example, forestry, also makes merging with other municipalities more difficult.

Finally, in the case of the Meiji mergers, it was difficult for municipalities to merge in the case where the amalgamated municipality would have a very large surface area. In mountainous regions, this would result in excessively difficult travel within the municipality itself,
as mountain ranges would need to be crossed. This could lead to additional expenses or, alternatively, could be thought of as causing non-pecuniary difficulties related to heterogeneity. In the case of flat agricultural land the difficulties appear mainly to be due to differences in the resources held by different portions of a potential amalgamated municipality, or alternatively differences in the sort of irrigation needed. For a variety of reasons there appears to thus have been an upper limit on land area in an amalgamated area.

### I.4 Franchise Rules

Under the new municipal laws, the electorate in cities was divided into three classes, and that in towns and villages into two. The total number of seats in the council was determined by municipal population (art. 11, *shi-sei*). The franchise was restricted to men at least 25 years old, paying more than ¥2 in *chiso* tax or direct taxes to the national government. The electorate was divided according to the amount of tax paid (art. 12, *shi-sei*).
Table 27: Municipal Franchise, Tsuyama Town, Okayama Prefecture (1908)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tax classification</th>
<th>Number elected</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-5th class</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10th</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15th</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16-18th</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-33rd</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Sakamoto [1975], Table 15.

Table 26 shows the divisions of the electorate in Takamastu City. The number of seats assigned is directly proportional to the amount of tax paid. If, as previously argued, taxation is proportional, then the electoral power is also proportional to tax base. This provides justification for the modelling choice of weighting players by their tax base in the social planner’s utility function, as these are the weights that appear to be accorded to individuals in the elections in this period.\(^\text{125}\)

**J Heisei Merger Finances**

Weese [2015b] discusses the financial transfer system in place during the 2000-2010 municipal mergers in some detail. For simulations in this paper, we use a further simplified version of the transfer system.

Table 28 shows that the calculated transfers during this period correspond roughly to the fixed cost plus variable cost system in place since the Showa period. Table 29 shows that the changes in the transfer system during the merger period, designed to provide incentives for merging, correspond roughly to a decrease in transfers of a lump sum of about ¥300 million per municipality, but the transfer corresponding to the variable cost component did not change.

\(^\text{125}\)Table 27 shows the situation in Tsuyama, Okayama, in 1908. This table (combined with the population data from Table 22) shows unequal electoral results in the municipality that implemented the comparatively progressive tax scheme of Table 22. It thus seems likely that either the franchise was even more skewed in the earlier period, or some regulations were put in place during the later period to require a roughly proportional tax system. Kashiwagi [1999] describes the municipal tax system during this period as one characterized by “arbitrariness and compassion”. Within a village, the rich and poor were connected in many ways other than the tax system, and thus, even if it were possible, it may not have been in the interest of the elite to tax the less fortunate at an extortionary rate.
Table 28: Dependent variable is \( c(g_s) \), cost of providing general services ('96-'97 fiscal year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1294.6</td>
<td>808.4</td>
<td>834.3</td>
<td>792.2</td>
<td>902.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(23.0)</td>
<td>(24.4)</td>
<td>(25.2)</td>
<td>(27.1)</td>
<td>(21.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POPULATION</td>
<td>136.4</td>
<td>136.0</td>
<td>136.6</td>
<td>142.3</td>
<td>142.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.3)</td>
<td>(0.3)</td>
<td>(0.3)</td>
<td>(1.7)</td>
<td>(1.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREA</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCOME.INEQ</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-20.9</td>
<td>-12.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.8)</td>
<td>(4.9)</td>
<td>(4.3)</td>
<td>(3.3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCOME</td>
<td>-1070.4</td>
<td>-779.8</td>
<td>-164.9</td>
<td>-483.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(69.0)</td>
<td>(104.3)</td>
<td>(69.1)</td>
<td>(79.8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS.CITY</td>
<td>324.1</td>
<td>369.8</td>
<td>-16.2</td>
<td>295.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(54.9)</td>
<td>(54.2)</td>
<td>(59.2)</td>
<td>(48.1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP * INCOME.INEQ</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td>(0.1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP * INCOME</td>
<td>-30.5</td>
<td>-8.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.0)</td>
<td>(1.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POP * IS.CITY</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.2)</td>
<td>(1.7)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFECTURE</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3220</td>
<td>3216</td>
<td>3216</td>
<td>3216</td>
<td>3216</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Units: ¥1,000,000 (roughly $10,000) per year. POPULATION is in thousands of residents, AREA is in square kilometers, INCOME is in ¥1,000,000 per capita per year, INCOME.INEQ is the coefficient of variation of income, IS.CITY is a dummy variable coded as 1 if the municipality in question is a city, and zero if it is a village or town. PREFECTURE is a set of dummy variables for each of the 47 prefectures, with the restriction that the sum of the coefficients on these variables must equal zero. Designated cities and special wards are excluded from the regression because they have additional responsibilities devolved from the prefectural governments, and thus have higher (and non-comparable) expenditures per capita.
Table 29: Dependent variable is $c(g_S)$, cost of providing general services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>96-97</th>
<th>06-07</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Intercept)</td>
<td>899.9</td>
<td>582.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(43.9)</td>
<td>(59.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POPULATION</td>
<td>129.4</td>
<td>131.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5)</td>
<td>(0.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREA</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
<td>(0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1194</td>
<td>1194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Units: ¥1,000,000 (roughly $10,000) per year. POPULATION is in thousands of residents, AREA is in square kilometers, designated cities and special wards are excluded as in Table 28. The sample is further restricted to those municipalities that did not participate in a merger in order to have the same sample in both periods. Thus, the change in coefficients represents a change in national government transfer policy on the same group of municipalities during the period in question. Inflation during this period was negligible.

Figure 27: Predicted and actual Standard Fiscal Need, Heisei data